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Sherry, Bennett, M.A., Spring 2012 History
Abstract King of Kings
Chairperson:  Dr. Tobin Miller Shearer
In the spring of 1968, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s personal rule and Iran’s domestic 
stability were at an all-time high.  For five years, Iran had enjoyed the boons of the Shah’s White 
Revolution.  This program of economic and social reform had placed Iran on the path to 
becoming one of the most populous, prosperous, and powerful nations in the Middle East. In 
January 1968 the United Kingdom announced it would withdraw its military from the Persian 
Gulf.  The Shah seized upon this opportunity and that provided by the promulgation of the Nixon 
Doctrine in 1969 to put Iran on the road to regional hegemony.
The Shah pursued a variety of security goals aimed at positioning Iran as the hegemon of the 
Persian Gulf and leader of the littoral Indian Ocean nations.  He also embarked on a rhetorical 
campaign to reinforce the legitimacy of the Pahlavi dynasty and establish himself as the heir to 
the power and prestige of ancient Persian monarchs like Cyrus the Great.  In addition to the 
power of Cyrus, the Shah connected himself to the legacy of the Cyrus Cylinder, which he 
claimed as the first code of human rights in the world.
To establish himself as the leader of the post-colonial Indian Ocean nations, the Shah not only 
pursued realpolitik security initiatives, he utilized the rhetoric of human rights.  In 1968, Tehran 
hosted the first International Conference on Human Rights.  At this conference and in a variety 
of other international theatres, the Shah’s rhetoric emerged in force.  His human rights rhetoric, 
however, was divided; he elevated socioeconomic rights and national development above, and as 
the path to, political agency and civil justice.  
This thesis examines the ways in which the Shah’s international human rights rhetoric had 
unintended consequences for Iran’s domestic stability and the Shah’s regional security goals.  In 
dividing human rights in both rhetoric and practice, the Shah created conditions that collided 
with economic downturn and civil unrest to create revolution in 1978-1979.  By exploring this 
level of discourse between the Shah’s international rhetoric and domestic audience, this thesis 
demonstrates the necessity of considering human rights as indivisible and as an integral part of 
any security policy.
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Introduction
When Vice President Richard Nixon arrived in Tehran on December 9, 1953, the city was 
quiet.  The silence belied the violence of just two days past and the simmering anger of a 
conflicted nation.  On December 7, one hundred and sixty students had met in a University of 
Tehran classroom to plan a demonstration in response to the December 5 announcement that the 
Shah was reopening diplomatic ties with the United Kingdom.1  The planned demonstration was 
to coincide with the vice president’s visit in order to “inform him directly of the corrupted 
regime” of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.  Upon hearing of the planned demonstration, “the 
Shah’s forces” sent soldiers to the classroom; the results are perhaps predictable. The professor 
was held at gunpoint while two randomly selected students were taken out of the classroom to be 
“severely beaten.”2  First-hand accounts of the event vary on what happened next; students may 
have begun calling for help or shouting at the soldiers.  One student recalls that, while the 
students attempted to flee, the soldiers fired on the crowd, killing three students.  In a 1961 letter 
to Senator Hubert Humphrey on behalf of the Iranian Student Association of Northern 
California, this student reflected on the events of December 7 from the relative safety of 
Berkeley.  He laments a December 8 New York Times article that described the students as 
“Communists who attacked the soldiers to get their guns.”  The article provides numbers that 
                                                
1 Sources vary on the intent of the demonstration. PressTV insists that it was to protest ties with the US while 
Chamran infers that it was a demonstration in response to the reopening of diplomatic ties with Britain.
2 Letter from Mostafa Chamran to Senator Humphrey, 13 December 1961, Series 13, Box 41, Folder 5, Mike 
Mansfield Papers, Archives & Special Collections, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library, The University of 
Montana-Missoula.
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conflict with the student’s account, claiming that the crowd of students numbered only thirty to 
forty and that only two students were fatally wounded.3  The student ended his letter with the 
sentiment that the American account of the event “saddens me greatly.”4 The student was 
Mostafa Chamran, and, after a further decade of intimidation and threats of passport withdrawal, 
his emotions evolved from sadness and denial to anger and violence.  Chamran remarked that the 
events of December 7 were “burned in my memory.”  In the 1970s he actively trained Islamic 
revolutionary guerillas in the Middle East and Africa, and after the Iranian revolution of 1979, he 
was named the Islamic Republic of Iran’s first defense minister and commander of the 
Revolutionary Guard.5  A confluence of American and British foreign policy agendas sparked 
this incident and left an indelible mark on the psyche of Iranians like Chamran.  It was not the 
first time the foreign policy of great powers altered the course of Iran’s history; it would not be 
the last.
* * * * * 
Iran’s history throughout the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 1941-1979) is intricately 
tied with American and British policy in the Persian Gulf.  The 1953 protest described by 
Chamran was in response to the Shah’s decision to reopen diplomatic ties with the United 
Kingdom and Vice President Nixon’s visit to Tehran.  In 1968, the Shah embarked on a course 
of foreign and military policy designed to position Iran and himself as “policeman” of the 
Middle East.6  Iran’s more aggressive foreign policy emerged because of several factors that 
provided the Shah with the means and opportunity to pursue his goals of making the Iranian state 
                                                
3 Robert C. Doty, “2 Teheran Students Slain, 1 Hurt As Foes of Britain Fight Troops,” New York Times, December 
8, 1953.
4 Letter from Mostafa Chamran to Senator Humphrey, 13 December 1961
5 Gregory F. Rose, “The Post-Revolutionary Purge of Iran’s Armed Forces: A Revisionist Assessment,” Iranian 
Studies, 17.2/3 (Spring – Summer, 1984), 183.
6 Leslie M. Pryor, “Arms and the Shah,” Foreign Policy, no. 31 (Summer, 1978), 61.
5
into a regional leader and world power.  The Shah seized upon the opportunities created by his 
extensive program of socioeconomic reforms known as the White Revolution, which he
announced and the Iranian government began implementing in 1963.  This economic success and 
the fulfillment of several key security goals allowed the Shah to act on his international vision 
for Iran and aggressively pursue a foreign policy agenda designed to establish Iran as hegemon 
in the Persian Gulf and leader of the Indian Ocean Littoral Nations.  
A hegemon is here defined as a state in an international system that has attained a level of 
capabilities that makes it the most powerful state in its system and that is so powerful that it has 
the ability to dominate all the other states in the system.7  Though hegemony in this context most 
often refers to global hegemons, such as the British Empire in the nineteenth century or the 
United States in the twenty-first, John Mearsheimer makes the important distinction that 
“system” does not necessarily indicate a global system; regional hegemons “dominate distinct 
geographical areas.”8 Mearsheimer defines a potential hegemon as a “great power with so much 
actual military capability and so much potential power that its stands a good chance of 
dominating and controlling all of the other great powers in its region of the world.”9  Forging 
Iran into such a power was the Shah’s ultimate goal; he believed that within a quarter century 
Iran would be a world power on par economically with West Germany.10  Utilizing his nation’s 
oil wealth, he was able to build a superior military that was the envy of the other Middle Eastern 
states. 
                                                
7 See: John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 40; 
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 29; and William 
C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1993), 12-14.
8 Mearsheimer, 40.
9 Ibid, 45.
10 Special to The New York Times, “Shah Offers Plan for Indian Ocean,” The New York Times, September 29, 1974, 
accessed April 20, 2012, 
http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/120043133/136371550F442999DDA/1?accountid=14593
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The Shah’s military and geopolitical aspirations emerged at the same time that global 
power structures were beginning to change and that international conceptions of human rights 
were evolving.  The Shah capitalized on these changes in his espousal of an international rhetoric 
of human rights that spoke to the desires of a developing world.  The global enunciation of 
human rights norms that began in the 1940s introduced to the colonized nations of Africa and 
Asia western conceptions of human rights based in international law and agreements.  These 
norms, evolving from the Enlightenment traditions of the eighteenth century and from liberal 
democratic agendas in the nineteenth century and with precedents in various historical religious 
and social traditions across the globe, were centered on the individual.  However, calls from the 
wealthy nations of the global “North” for political and civil rights rang hollow in the ears of 
Third World autocratic modernizers; individual political participation seemed insignificant while 
their nations lived in poverty and their national security was threatened by a global cold war.  
Voices of challenge rose from the post-colonial world with the growing power of authoritarian 
leaders and the emergence of a sense of second-class international status to American and 
European nations.  Mohammad Reza Shah was at the forefront of these modernizing autocrats.
Domestically, the Shah presented himself as the beneficent father figure of his nation; he 
attempted to position Iran as the policeman of the Middle East and guarantor of Gulf oil.  
Internationally, the Shah believed that Iran, and through Iran, himself, were the inheritors of 
ancient Persian might and were thus destined for dominance in the Persian Gulf as well as 
international recognition as a great power.  Beginning in the 1960s, the Shah utilized human 
rights rhetoric to influence the perceptions of regional actors.  During the 1970s, he combined 
this international rhetoric with regional security initiatives.  
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* * * * *
The existing scholarship on Iran during this period takes an almost teleological approach 
to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, attempting to show how the Shah’s brutality made the rise of 
the Islamic Republic inevitable.  Much of this scholarship focuses either on aspects of the Shah’s 
foreign policy in a Cold War setting or on his repression of political opposition in Iran.    Few 
studies have successfully addressed the fact that, because of an abundance of foreign media and 
the rising access of urban Iranians to these forms mass media, the Shah’s international rhetoric 
collided with his domestic agendas.  Further, the majority of Iranian scholarship on this period is 
concerned with either the Shah’s repression of his people or with his security connections with 
America.  While this project does not deny the brutality of the Shah’s regime and its violations of 
human rights during the 1960s and 70s, it focuses instead on how the Shah used human rights to 
his own benefit abroad and how that undermined both his domestic security and the stability of 
the Persian Gulf.
The historiography of human rights in general, and in Iran specifically, is still emerging 
and a great deal of work lies ahead.  In particular, the connections between human rights and 
international security need to be further explored by historians.  Most scholarship addresses this 
theme either prescriptively or descriptively; however, detailed case studies of the regional 
security ramifications of human rights abuses or rhetorical devices remains largely untilled 
ground for historians.  
A wave of scholarship over the past two decades has marked the relatively late entry of 
history as a discipline into the field of human rights.  Despite this growing body of historical
literature, few scholars have extensively examined the connections between human rights and 
regional security in the Middle East.  While political science and law scholars have been 
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involved in the human rights discussion since its inception, few scholars in either discipline have 
seriously considered how actors have applied human rights within the Middle Eastern security 
complex.  The questions surrounding the connection between security and human rights are 
particularly significant in Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s Iran.  During the 1960s and 70s Iran 
began its rise to regional dominance while allegations of egregious human rights violations under 
the Shah’s regime increased.  In his public rhetoric, the Shah utilized a language of human rights 
that elevated national socioeconomic human rights – positive rights to education, healthcare, 
economic success, property, and social and gender equality – to forward his international agenda 
while ignoring the building discontent with the denial of individual political and civil rights in 
his own country.  
The recent body of historical human rights scholarship has begun to question the 
inception of human rights; when and where did it begin and why has it emerged as a social norm 
in international affairs today?11  Human rights scholars must also wrestle with the question of 
cultural relativism; are human rights merely a social construction of the West that are imposed
on the rest of the world?  Leaders in the West and elsewhere invoke human rights for seemingly 
self-indulgent aims; however, scholars point to the increasing relevance of individuals and non-
state entities in human rights discourse over time.  
                                                
11 See: Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (London: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 299; Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York: Norton, 2007), 20-21, 34, 
82; and Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010), 311-313.  Hunt traces our modern understanding of rights to the 18th century French and American 
Revolutions.  Borgwardt traces the emergence of contemporary human rights norms and ideas to post-war America.  
She examines America’s role as international leader in the 1940s and its role in forwarding an agenda of rights and 
collective security.  Moyn dates the emergence of the contemporary idea and practice of human rights to the 1970s.  
This date is in large part due to how Moyn defines human rights, and his particular focus on the current conception 
of rights norms as individual rights.  He argues that it is the contemporary understanding of human rights as rights of 
the individual that transcend those of the “nation-state that accounts for the relevance of human rights in the last 
three decades.”   
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Perhaps one of the most important debates in the history of human rights is the genesis 
and proper place of political and civil rights in relation to social and economic rights.  The 
implications of the divisibility of human rights have far-reaching ramifications for international 
security.  What are the consequences of emphasizing one type of human right while denying
others?  Neither the Iran-specific literature nor human rights scholarship in general has 
sufficiently addressed specific relationships between the articulation of certain forms of human 
rights rhetoric and regional security.  Though many of the general human rights works consider 
the role of human rights rhetoric, practice, and how divisions between socioeconomic and 
political and civil rights interact with regional security in a general sense, they consider few 
specific case studies as a means to understanding these relationships.  
This project rejects the idea that there is a distinction between socioeconomic and 
political and civil rights in particular cultures or geographies.  To understand the relationship 
between conceptions of rights and their role in regional security requires first an understanding 
of the principles of the universality and indivisibility of human rights.  If human rights are 
universal across cultures and time, then universal assumptions can be made in particular case 
studies.  If rights are indivisible from each other and from realpolitik security concerns, then any 
case study or policy that considers one aspect should be prepared to deal with its relationship to 
the others.  Paul Gordon Lauren and Micheline Ishay document the history of human rights from 
antiquity to the present.12  Both authors see a particular continuity across time and cultures 
within the history of human rights.13  Paul Lauren’s, The Evolution of International Human 
                                                
12 Lauren traces human rights norms to the “first charter of human rights” – the Cyrus Cylinder that the first Persian 
shah, Cyrus the Great, crafted 2500 years ago in Iran.  Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human 
Rights: Visions Seen, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011) 12.
13 Lynn Hunt stands with those who criticize works like those by Lauren and Ishay as too teleological, arguing that 
they construct a history of human rights as an inevitable story of human progress. Samuel Moyn criticizes both 
Lauren’s and Ishay’s syntheses, which he claims “fall into teleology, tunnel vision, and triumphalism, focusing on 
the background or, at the latest, the 1940s.”
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Rights: Visions Seen and Ishay’s The History of Human Rights stress the universal applicability 
of human rights and attempt to understand the consequences of dividing human rights in theory 
and in practice. Lauren makes the important distinction that, while all societies have not “always 
subscribed to the same basic beliefs and values… the moral worth of each person is a belief that 
no single civilization, or people, or nation, or geographical area, or even century can claim as 
uniquely its own.”14  In addition to his rejection of the idea that human rights are a solely 
Western phenomenon, two of Lauren’s most convincing arguments are his rejection of the idea 
that human rights in the West are concerned only with political and civil rights and his denial 
that the “‘idealism’ of rights and the ‘realism’ of security are complete opposites.”15  Ishay 
argues that in addition to the test of renewing “universalist aspirations, bridging developed and 
developing world concerns and reasserting the inalienability and indivisibility of civil-political 
and socioeconomic rights,” the human rights community must also connect global justice and 
human rights with “any [geopolitical] strategy that hopes to achieve long-term security.”16  
Ishay’s prescription that any regional or global security strategy must take human rights into 
consideration is especially true in the Shah’s Iran.  Though he attempted to emphasize the 
socioeconomic dimensions of human rights that he believed were necessary for the people of 
Iran, the Shah’s prolonged disregard for political and civil justice and freedoms had dire 
consequences for his international vision for Iran’s rise to global power.
In examining the relationship between human rights and security policy, the present 
project speaks to the trend, begun by scholars like David Forsythe of arguing that national and 
international security concerns cannot be divorced from human rights in theory or in the 
                                                
14 Lauren, 13.
15 Ibid., 278.
16 Micheline R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 2008), 284.
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formulation of effective national policy and international law.  In his 1983 monograph, Human 
Rights and World Politics, Forsythe explains the principles behind human rights regarding its 
law, rhetoric and politics, and practice in reality.  Like the current project, Forsythe connects 
international security and human rights; however, his focus is on American foreign policy.  What 
Forsythe believes is necessary in a comprehensive foreign policy is “a combination of President 
Jimmy Carter’s willingness to look at the internal forces and conditions which determine much 
of politics, and Henry Kissinger’s ability to present an overall vision of the world.”17  This
combination of ideology and geopolitics is an integral part of considering how the Shah’s 
international rhetoric and strategy interacted with “internal forces and conditions” in Iran.  
Forsythe claims that the goal of human rights is to “insist that the power, security, and economic 
well-being of states and their ruling elites be accompanied by concern for the average citizen 
and/or the least well-off in political and economic terms.”18  Forsythe argues that each type of 
right, be it political, civil, social, or economic, is dependent on and essential to the others.  The 
Shah’s failure to understand the interconnections between different types of rights helps to 
explain in part the upheaval of the late 1970s.  
The current project aspires to enter the debate over the relationship between 
socioeconomic rights and political/civil rights to help reveal a particular facet of this relationship 
and its impact on the Shah’s Iran.  This project argues that human rights are indivisible from one 
another, and that historically, attempts to divide them in rhetoric or in practice have created a less 
pleasant and less secure world.  This debate is perhaps the most important and consistent in the 
scholarship of human rights during the Cold War.  In his 2010 history, Indivisible Human Rights, 
Daniel Whelan attempts to understand what is meant when international institutions describe 
                                                
17 Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics, 123.  
18 Forsythe, 129.
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human rights as “indivisible.”  Whelan argues that during and after the decolonization 
movement, the developing world seized the idea of the indivisibility of rights to stress the 
importance of economic and social rights over political and civil rights.  This movement was led 
in no small part by the Shah during the 1968 International Conference on Human Rights in 
Tehran.  To these developing nations led by autocratic modernizers, the primary goal was 
equality in the international system with the white western nations.  Whelan places particular 
emphasis on the 1968 Conference.  At this conference, marking the twentieth anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration, the rights rhetoric of the developing world began to emerge in strength.  
He notes the disconnect at Tehran “between the strong rhetoric that the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights is impossible without the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural rights, and 
any link of that principle to the broader call for development assistance.”19  The most important 
watershed moment for Whelan came in 1993 with the World Conference on Human Rights and 
the subsequent restoration of the concept of indivisibility of human rights after decades of Cold 
War-era division between socioeconomic and political rights.  
In the specific case of the Shah’s Iran, this project agrees with Whelan’s assertion that 
these rights should be and were indivisible. The Iran of the 1960s and 70s lacked truly “modern 
political and economic institutions” upon which, as Whelan argues, “the indivisibility of civil, 
political, economic, and social rights” relies.20  Despite the great deal of historical, political, and 
legal scholarship that exists on Iran during the period in question, few works have specifically 
addressed the connections between the Shah’s international rhetoric and regional security.  F. 
Gregory Gause III’s The International Relations of the Persian Gulf combines constructivist and 
realist international relations theory to understand what he designates the “regional security 
                                                
19 Daniel J. Whelan, Indivisible Human Rights: A History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 
151.
20 Ibid.
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complex” of the Persian Gulf.  He identifies how social norms, traditional threats, and 
perceptions all interact with geopolitical strategy and Gulf oil.  Though his short book is 
revelatory in this regard, there is not a single specific mention of human rights as a factor in 
regional security.  
The present project attempts to avoid both ideological affiliation and the biting criticism
of authors like James Bill in his book, The Eagle and the Lion. Bill is overtly hostile and critical 
of the Shah’s regime, which hampers a more comprehensive understanding of the Shah’s 
convictions and the intentions behind the rhetoric.  In attempting to avoid this pitfall, this project 
seeks to speak to works like Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran Between Two Revolutions by adding an 
additional level of analysis.  Abrahamian provides a detailed and sweeping analysis of the period 
between Iran’s 1906 and 1979 revolutions; however, because of its comprehensive nature, Iran 
Between Two Revolutions does not delve specifically into the connections between human rights 
and regional security.21  
The current project is an attempt to expand on Abrahamian’s revelations about why the 
1979 revolution took place and to explain how conceptions of human rights and the uneven way 
the Shah employed them in his rhetoric contributed to the instability inherent in what 
Abrahamian describes as the “politics of uneven development.”22  One of the more important 
analyses in his, Iran Between Two Revolutions, is Abrahamian’s rejection of the reasons for the 
downfall of the Shah supplied by the monarch’s critics and his supporters.  Supporters of the 
monarchy, says Abrahamian, claim that the Shah lost power because he modernized too quickly 
for his backward, semi-feudal populace still trapped in their traditions.23  Critics of the Shah, on 
                                                
21 James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1988); 
22 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 426-427.
23 The Shah echoes this in his Answer to History.
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the other hand, claimed that he did not modernize quickly enough, and the outmoded political 
structures of Iran threw the country into the grasp of religious extremists.  Abrahamian utilizes a 
pseudo-Marxist framework of analysis that blames the revolution not on under- or over-
development but on uneven development.  Abrahamian examines how changing class dynamics 
interacted with socioeconomic development and political repression to produce societal stress.  
This project is in dialogue with Abrahamian’s extensive works and is an attempt to contribute a 
new level of understanding to the reasons for revolution in 1979; it examines how the Shah’s 
rhetoric collided with the social, economic, and demographic pressures that Abrahamian 
elaborates.  
* * * * *
Above all, this project is an attempt to understand the Shah’s human rights rhetoric –
what characterized his rhetoric, why did he utilize this rhetoric, and what were its implications 
for and impact on regional security?  Personal identity and experience play a fundamental role in 
the individual convictions of all people; people and ideas matter.  Religious, ethnic, national, 
geographic, political, and individual identities all play a role in the construction of social norms 
and individual beliefs.  The existence of varying individual and international conceptions of 
human rights means that these rights are not abstractions; they are real factors that impact the 
ways in which individual actors and governments perceive the world.  This project considers 
human rights and international security as indivisible and asserts that socioeconomic rights are 
indivisible from political and civil rights.  This framework is an attempt to move away from 
defining these concepts separately in order to reveal the beliefs and motives of the historical 
actors under scrutiny.  In the same way that rights should not be divorced from each other or 
15
from security, they should not be separated from the long historical understanding that laid the 
foundation for their contemporary meaning.  
In the pursuit of his regional security objectives, the Shah utilized a variety of rhetorical 
approaches, the most important of which was that of human rights.  He connected his White 
Revolution to the international arena and Afro-Asian calls for decolonization, national 
development, and racial equality.  The Shah’s elevation of national, social, and economic rights 
came at the expense of the individual political and civil rights of Iranians.  The use of this 
rhetoric interacted disastrously with the economic and demographic changes taking place in Iran 
caused by the Shah’s program of reform.  His division of human rights and the elevation of 
certain rights over others contributed in a very real way to destabilizing his regime, fomenting 
dissent and undermining Iran’s geopolitical rise to world power status.
By exploring the connections and divisions between ideology, rhetoric, and policy in 
Iran, this study aims to reveal new levels of discourse between nation states, between regional 
actors, and between rulers and the ruled.  Because of the dichotomy between the Shah’s 
mercurial ascendancy and meteoric fall, these levels of discourse play a particularly important 
role in understanding the decades preceding the Iranian Revolution of 1979.  Isolated in a 
rhetorical prison of his own making, the Shah failed to understand that these avenues of 
discourse existed and that they were in contact with each other.  The Shah utilized specific 
reforms, policies, and rhetoric leading up to and after 1968 to create the perception in the 
international community that Iran and the Shah acted as regional leaders in the Persian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean; these foreign policies and rhetorical techniques in the international theatre created 
pressures in the Iranian domestic population that contributed to the eventual demise of the 
Iranian monarchy.
16
* * * * * 
Samuel Moyn describes 1968 as a “global disruption.”24 It was indeed a moment of 
remarkable transition for Iran, for the Shah’s regime, and for the international human rights 
movement.  The Shah’s White Revolution, though not fully realized, gradually improved Iran’s 
economic situation and revolutionized the social structure of Iran.  In the spring of 1968, the 
United Nations held its International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran on the twentieth 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  That same year the British 
announced the withdrawal of their military assets from the Persian Gulf, creating a power 
vacuum.25  In 1969 President Richard Nixon promulgated the Nixon Doctrine, which provided 
American allies with a veritable blank check to undertake regional security initiatives germane to 
US interests.  
The three chapters that follow will be semi-chronological, but are mainly organized upon 
thematic lines.  Chapter One begins well before 1968.  It charts the development of the Shah’s 
model of rule and details the effects of European imperialism on Iran beginning in the eighteenth 
century.  Iran’s collision with European pseudo-colonization during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries had a definite impact on the Shah and contributed to his desire to make Iran an 
independent world power.  His conviction that Iran was destined to regain the ancient power of 
the Persian Empire and his desire to craft a message of legitimacy for the Iranian monarchy 
under the Pahlavi dynasty led the Shah to embrace an image of power and history that connected 
himself with Cyrus the Great – the first Persian king.  
The next chapter shifts the focus from the Shah’s domestic initiatives of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s to his foreign and military policies of the same period.  Building on the evidence 
                                                
24 Moyn, 3.
25 Faisal bin Salman al-Saud, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition (New York: I.B. Tauris 
& Co Ltd, 2003), vi-181.
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in Chapter One that the Shah wanted to make Iran a world power and regional hegemon, Chapter 
Two explains the particular agendas and policies he implemented to achieve these goals.  Among 
a host of real security concerns involving oil, radical subversion, and military build-up, the Shah 
also embraced a rhetoric of human rights that spoke to the emerging desires of Third World 
autocrats for equality with the West.  The Shah aimed this rhetoric at an international audience as 
a way to increase their identification with Iran and in the hopes that the nations of the Indian 
Ocean would one day embrace him as their natural leader in the international arena.  
The final chapter reflects on the implications of this international rhetoric in Iran’s 
domestic population.  Despite his intentions, the Shah’s rhetoric reached not only the ears of 
regional rulers but was read and heard by a domestic population frustrated by uneven 
development and political repression.  This chapter elaborates the collision of the Shah’s foreign 
rhetoric with the variety of human rights violations in Iran before shifting to the existence of 
oppositional rhetoric and ideologies in Iran.  In response to the Shah’s international rhetoric and 
lack of political agency, oppositional rhetoric took the form of groups like the Tudeh Communist 
party, the liberal democrats of the National Front, and most importantly, the increasingly 
powerful Shia clergy.  This project ends with a conclusion that is a brief look forward to the 
Shah’s final days and to the implications of this Iranian case study on the larger issues of global 
human rights.
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Chapter One
Constructing Destiny
The White Revolution and the Emergence of Imperial Rhetoric
“Persia will trust in him and in his fame,
Her champions will rejoice to hear his name,
Throughout his life the monarchy will thrive,
In times to come this glory will survive;
Before his name, inscribed on every seal,
Persia and Rum and India will kneel.”
Ferdowsi, Shahnameh1
In 1925, a five-year-old boy named Mohammad Reza Pahlavi received two visions from 
God.  The first came soon after his investiture as Crown Prince.  Deathly ill with typhoid fever, 
the boy “hovered between life and death.”  After weeks in this state, the boy was visited by a 
dream in which the “chief lieutenant of Mohammed,” Ali, came to him.  Ali told the boy to drink 
from a bowl.  When Mohammad Reza awoke the next day, his fever was gone.  During the same 
year, the boy was riding a horse in the mountains surrounding Tehran when he was thrown from 
the saddle, fell, and was saved from smashing his head against a rock by the intervention of the 
Islamic saint Abbas.  A year later he was visited by yet another revelation.2  These visions were 
“apparitions” of “prophets.”  More substantial than dreams, these visions had a profound effect 
                                                
1 Abol1asem Ferdowsi, Shahnameh: The Persian Book of Kings, trans. Dick Davis (New York: Penguin, 2006), 83.
2 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (London 1961), 55; in Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 38-39.
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on the young boy, though no one, even his father – the great Reza Shah – believed him.3  These 
visions, whether reality or fantasy, played an important role in how the Shah presented an image 
of himself to the public.  Even if the visions were not authentic but were merely an invention of a
sickly child or a self-aggrandizing man later in life, they still reveal much about the man, his 
aspirations, and his dreams.  During his life, the Shah spoke of these visions and utilized such 
stories of divine providence to invest his dynasty with a public legitimacy and sense of destiny 
that transcended mere political legitimacy.  The Shah’s reign after 1963 was marked by public 
spectacles, imperial symbols, and history bordering on mythology and triumphalism; the Shah 
combined public spectacle with his rhetorical appeals to craft an image of a powerful and 
monolithic Iranian institution of monarchy upheld by its overwhelming international successes.4
The Shah later claimed that he believed these visions instilled in him a feeling that he 
hand been “chosen by God to accomplish a mission.”  This mission was to save Iran.  In public, 
he consistently connected his campaign to modernize Iran with a sense of supernatural 
guidance.5  He maintained that he believed that his reign “saved the country… because God was 
beside” him.  This was, he claimed, a statement of humility, for though he could take singular 
credit for all of “the great things” he had done for Iran, he wanted to acknowledge that he did not 
do these things alone.  God helped.  Though these two visions never returned, the Shah publicly 
embraced his “mysticism,” and he claimed to have prophetic dreams at regular intervals of one 
or two years.  In a 1973 interview with the Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci, he refused to divulge 
                                                
3 Oriana Fallaci, Interviews with History and Conversations with Power (New York: Rizzoli International, 2011), 
150-153.
4 For an account of how mythologies and public demonstrations play a role in reinforcing autocratic power, see: 
Richard S. Wortman Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy Volume I and II (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).  The Shah’s use of myth and ceremony is remarkably similar to Wortman’s 
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The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society – the Soviet Case (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
5 See also: Milani, The Shah, 38-39, 127.
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the content of these dreams since they related to the domestic problems of Iran and “so should be 
considered state secrets.”   Indeed, the Shah attributed his survival of an assassination attempt to 
divine intervention.  As the Shah told the story, he reacted because of an instinct born of 
presentiment, and moved the fraction of a second needed before the assassin unloaded a revolver 
into the Shah’s heart, and the bullet hit his shoulder instead.  This 1949 assassination attempt, 
though no doubt terrifying for the young Shah, provided excellent evidence in the creation of a 
divine mandate for the Shah’s regime.  After the first shot, the head of the Shah’s security detail 
dived under his principal’s Rolls Royce.  The first three of the assassin’s bullets only grazed the 
Shah’s hat; the fourth entered his cheek and exited through his upper lip; the fifth hit the acrobat 
Shah in the shoulder as described above; and the sixth lodged in the barrel of the would-be 
assassin’s revolver.  The Shah claimed that his survival was “thanks to a miracle willed by God 
and the prophets.”  The Shah embraced experiences like these to construct the public image that 
his life and his reign went forward “under the sign of destiny.”  Whether or not his stories were 
genuine is irrelevant; the Shah’s persistent efforts to present himself to the world and Iran as the 
agent of God and driver of destiny played an important role in the way he utilized rhetorical 
approaches in his foreign and domestic policies.6
* * * * *
The weight of history lies heavy on the soil of Iran.  Its complex 2500-year history has 
unique effects on the rulers of that territory.  The austere and disapproving eyes of generations of
Persian rulers from Cyrus the Great, Darius, Xerxes, and Abbas to the present look over the 
shoulder of any man proud enough to don the mantle of Shah.  For Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 
this title and the identity connected with it was the force that guided his life and career.  A desire 
to live up to the strength of his father, to resurrect the prestige of Cyrus, and to secure his 
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family’s place in the lineage of the Persian Empire dominated his domestic and foreign policies.  
Mohammad Reza Shah’s understanding of his own destiny and of that of Iran, combined with a 
long history of foreign intervention, proved a substantial influence on his decision to establish 
Iran as an independent military and economic power with the ultimate goal of building the nation 
into a hegemonic power.
Global leaders of sufficient charisma often create images of themselves that coincide with 
their vision for the nation or group they lead; the Shah was not the only agent of social 
construction in the Middle East or in Iran.  The “imagined” nature of Middle Eastern states 
creates a complex environment of constructed identities that has far-reaching effects on 
international relations in the region.7  These identities – constructed by historical experience and 
the public machinations of leaders – played an integral part in the process of diplomacy, 
economics, and war in the Middle East during the second half of the twentieth century.  
Alexander Wendt argues that the condition of self-help evolves from interactions “in which each 
party acts in ways that the other feels are threatening to the self, creating expectations that the 
other is not to be trusted.  Competitive or egoistic identities are caused by such insecurity.”8  For 
instance, the perpetuation of Arab-Persian mistrust and lingering ancestral feuds ensured that 
Iraqis and Iranians would each continue to identify the other as a threat to the constructed image 
of the self even after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.  Matthew Hoffman points to the 
ability of norm entrepreneurs – actors or leaders who “advocate different ideas about appropriate 
behavior from organizational platforms that give their ideas credence” – to “alter behavior and 
beliefs in accordance with the norm entrepreneur’s ideas about how actors should behave and 
                                                
7 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1983).
8 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what states make of it:  the social construction of power politics,” International 
Organization 46:2 (Spring 1992), 406.
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think.”9  The interaction between the macro- and the micro-construction of norms leads to a 
fuller comprehension of how the Shah perceived his nation’s identity and role in the international 
system and explains in part his persistent attempts to manipulate Iranian public opinion during 
Iran’s rise to hegemony.  
The Shah fits well with Hoffman’s definition of norm entrepreneur, and his rhetoric of 
the 1960s and 70s evidences a deep understanding of how social norms are created.  Finnemore 
and Sikkink elaborate a “life cycle” of social norms.  Their definition of the three stages of this 
life cycle look particularly at how and why groups of states adopt new normative standards; 
however, they also acknowledge that “domestic norms… are deeply entwined with the workings 
of international norms.”10  The Shah seems to have been acutely aware of this process, albeit 
unconsciously.  The norm life cycle refers to three stages: emergence, cascade, and 
internalization.  Emergence is the process by which a norm entrepreneur rises and forwards their 
new social norm. The cascade stage is the period during which the new norm reaches and is 
accepted by a broader audience.  Finally, internalization is the process over time whereby people 
and states internalize the new norm as a normative standard.11  During Iran’s rise to hegemonic 
status in the Persian Gulf – a process fueled by the Shah’s identity as heir and champion of 
ancient Persian power and prestige – the Shah acted as a norm entrepreneur in an effort to create 
the image in Iran that he was the beneficent father of the nation that provided to them the boons 
of modernity.  Internationally, he worked to impose the image of Iran as the dominant power in 
the Persian Gulf and of himself as a leader of the formerly colonized African and Asian nations 
of the Indian Ocean.   
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The Shah believed that his duty and destiny was much more than regional policeman for 
the forces of America and the West.  He perceived of himself as heir to the tradition of the great 
Persian monarchs of antiquity.  The formation of the Pahlavi dynasty was far from creation by 
divine providence though.  His father, Reza, was an officer in the Iranian army until he cut a deal 
with the British to overthrow the Qajar dynasty and establish a strong Iranian monarchy to 
mitigate the effects of Iran’s constitutional revolution of 1906.12   His son, in order to achieve the 
goal of establishing himself as the heir to Persian dominance, worked tirelessly to impose an idea 
of himself and through him, Iran, as the rightful heirs to the position of hegemon in the Persian 
Gulf.  
To begin this process the Shah needed first to consolidate his hold on Iran and its people.  
In 1963 he launched the White Revolution, an aggressive top-down campaign of modernization 
and reform aimed at addressing social and economic disparities in Iran and saving the nation 
from economic crisis.  The concept of an Iranian state was not created from thin air; however, 
the Pahlavis nonetheless attempted to impose a western image of nationalism on a population to 
whom the concept was either unfamiliar or still emerging.  From the ashes of the 1906 
constitutional revolution and the ineffectual rule of the Qajar dynasty, Reza Shah began a rapid 
process of modernization that only increased during his son’s reign.  
Efforts to modernize and secularize Iran began before the Shah’s White Revolution, 
before his autocratic father’s campaign, and before the meddling of European powers.  The 
history of Iran’s transformation into a modern nation is a story of traditional tribal, local, and 
religious identities in conflict with the concept of the sovereign nation state.  In their attempts to 
forge a modern and secular Iran, modernizing intellectuals of the 19th century “ignored the multi-
ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious reality of the Iranian state.  They 
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overlooked the fundamental fact that Iran was not Persia or Persian but rather a mosaic of 
diverse, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups.”13  This history of division was a significant 
impediment to twentieth-century attempts at reform and the creation of a unified national 
identity.  
The Shah had to contend with a nation that was fundamentally divided along religious, 
ethnic, linguistic, and class lines.  His vigorous campaign of positive nationalism was hindered 
by a “disunited and undisciplined” populace, “speaking a variety of languages and dialects and 
belonging to a number of different subcultures.”14 In the 1960s and 70s, US policymakers 
concluded that Iran was “a country of great social, ethnic and linguistic diversity” that had 
transitioned to modernity with great difficulty.  Despite the “vague sense of ‘Persianness’” 
attributable to Iran’s strong literary tradition, a “strong sense of individualism…pervaded the 
society, with primary loyalties going to self and family.”15  To get Iranians to think in terms of a 
national identity that transcended the family, clan, or village, the Shah began to emphasize the 
Persian elements of the Iranian nation and culture.  This he accomplished through social and 
educational reforms as well as a persistent government campaign connecting the Shah with the 
ancient Persian lineage of kings and presenting him as the king of the Iranian people.16
As a result of this national disunity and a history of foreign interference, Iran has had to 
deal with a variety of domestic strife.  According to the US Department of State, during his 
reign, Mohammad Reza Shah had to contend with threats from “communist-led mobs and 
                                                
13 Mehrdad Kia, “Persian Nationalism and the Campaign for Language Purification,” Middle Eastern Studies, 34.2 
(Apr., 1998), 9-10.
14 1972 Update of: 1970 Iran Handbook, Central Intelligence Agency (April 1972), I-2 – I-3.
15 Reply from Robert McCloskey, Assistant Sec. for Congressional Relations, Dept of State to Donald M. Fraser, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, August 11, 1975; Box 3 Entry A1 5510; Human 
Rights – Indonesia to Human Rights – South Africa; Human Rights Subject Files, 1975; Human Rights in Iran, 
1975; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives Building, College Park, 
MD. and 1972 Update of: 1970 Iran Handbook, Central Intelligence Agency (April 1972), I-2 – I-3.
16 1972 Update of: 1970 Iran Handbook, Central Intelligence Agency (April 1972), I-2 – I-3
26
rebellious tribes and with violent opposition to his large and progressive programs of economic 
and social reform by ultra-rightists and religious conservatives.”17  In the early 1960s Iran was 
still a nation emerging into modernity from a recent history of decadence and feudalism.  This 
past and its vestiges were a significant hindrance to the Shah’s proposed reforms; a tradition of 
absolutism encouraged violent dissent.  In Iran, there was little tradition of representative 
government and public debate, the US Department of State argued that these were “new to Iran; 
street riots, terrorism and assassination… often replaced reasoned debate as means of political 
expression in the post-war period.”18   This history of violence left an indelible mark on the 
beliefs and psyche of Iranian rulers responsible for maintaining stability and tranquility during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Wedged between the Arab nations of the Middle East, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, 
and the turmoil of the Indian Subcontinent, Iran is “surrounded by peoples of different origins 
and cultures.” The CIA observed that, as a result, “the Persians believe they have no natural 
allies.”19  Iran had suffered at the hands of foreign powers since the dawn of the nineteenth 
century.  Since the reign of Fath Ali Shah in the early nineteenth century, the shahs of Iran had 
been both victims and agents of foreign intervention and European imperialism.  Mohammad 
Reza Shah was acutely aware of this history and of the manner in which his father, Reza Khan, 
had come to power and established the Pahlavi Dynasty.  This history of foreign manipulation 
coincided with the Shah’s “mission” for his country to convince him that international great 
powers and economic underdevelopment were frustrating the realization of Iran’s great destiny.
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* * * * *
The dynamic landscape that sits astride the expanse between the Caspian Sea and the 
Persian Gulf has been home to some of history’s most celebrated and dominant empires.  It has 
also played host to the ambitions of some of the great imperialistic powers; the Macedonian, 
Mongol, British, French, and Russian empires all made bids for control of this region at the 
height of their power.  Iran’s history is, like all other great and persistent world powers, marked 
by fluctuating power and territory.  Zeniths and nadirs of power checker Iran’s past from the 
Achaemenid Empire of Cyrus the Great, to those of Xerxes, Darius, Abbas, and Nader.  
Alongside the memory of these great Persian conquerors are the names of foreign invaders –
Alexander, Julian, Valerian, Tamerlane, and Genghis Khan.  Despite this foreign influence – or 
perhaps, because of it – the Iranian culture has persisted.  In 1798, Iran became a new front on 
the periphery of the global conflict that was the Napoleonic Wars.  These wars drew Iran under 
the Qajar dynasty into European affairs for the first time.  The nineteenth century witnessed the 
beginning and rise of European influence in Iran.  Wracked by a half-century of civil war, 
invasion and weakened by the decentralized rule of the Qajars, Iran became a focal point of 
British, French and Russian policy.  The Iranians were not simply pawns of European masters; 
their statesmen were shrewd and their leaders were strong.  A confluence of European 
imperialism, Iranian pride and vacillating alliances created intractable problems for the Qajar 
state and opened the doors to European ascendancy in Iranian affairs. Mohammad Reza Shah, 
when establishing his mission for Iran, classified the Qajars as the “weakest of the major Persian 
dynasties.  They did little to resist foreign infiltration, and even encouraged outside interference 
in [Iran’s] internal affairs by their indecisive policies.”20  The Shah was distinctly aware of the 
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succession of defeats and humiliations visited upon Iran by the Qajars’ acquiescence to foreign 
powers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Two men were responsible for opening Iran to a level of foreign domination unparalleled 
since the Mongol conquests.  The stories of Napoleon Bonaparte and Fath Ali Shah are among 
the great ironies of history.  Their policies created the opening for British and Russian 
dominance in Iran, which was exactly the opposite of their intent.  Napoleon opened the eyes of 
the great powers to the potential of this once powerful state.  Fath Ali Shah’s intransigence and 
irredentism were the downfall of his reign and his nation’s independence. In attempting to attain 
the success of Nader Shah and Cyrus the Great, he ensured his own defeat at the hands of the 
Russians.  This unfortunate monarch set the stage for a century and a half of foreign domination 
by the British and Russian Empires.  Fath Ali Shah’s failings ushered in a period of humiliation 
for Iran and its people.  His Qajar successors, in varying degrees of greed and ineptitude 
perpetuated a system of colonial exploitation that held Iran – one of the most populous nations in 
the Middle East and a former center of great learning and culture – back from modernity at a 
time when the great powers of Europe were experiencing unprecedented gains in technology, 
industry, economics, and military capability.21
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, Europe was torn apart by the Napoleonic Wars.  
Iran, already host to French, Dutch, and English diplomats and merchants because of its 
proximity to India, did not emerge unscathed from the grand designs of Napoleon.  His plans for 
a land route to India through Iran initiated a string of diplomatic efforts from the French and 
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British to gain the support of Fath Ali through promises of military aid and training.  Iran’s 
military was large but not equipped or trained to fight a war with a modern European force.  
During two wars with Russia, which also had designs on a land route to India and on Iran’s 
Caucasian border region, the professional imperial forces of Tzar Alexander I decimated Fath
Ali’s numerically superior forces.  In both wars, European allies abandoned Iran in its hour of 
need.  The British and the French discarded or ignored treaties with Iran as a result of changes in 
a European conflict a continent away.
The Battle of Aslanduz forced Fath Ali Shah to sign the Treaty of Gulistan in October of 
1813, a disastrous and humiliating settlement which ceded control of Georgia to the Russians 
and provided that only a Russian navy was allowed on the Caspian Sea.  Perhaps most harmful, 
the treaty forced free trade on Iranian markets, allowing the industrialized Russia to sell its 
cheaper manufactured goods in the bazaar.22  The Treaty of Turkmanchai was signed in February 
1828 and was even more humiliating than Gulistan; the Shah was forced to cede more territory to 
Russia, Iranian officials could not enter the residence of a Russian in Iran without consent, and 
the Shah was forced to make massive reparations payments.  To compound the humiliation, Iran 
had once more been betrayed by a European ally.  The British, as they had in 1804, and as the 
French had in 1807, refused to provide the military aid promised in their 1814 treaty, on the 
grounds that Iran had acted as aggressor.
The Treaties of Gulistan and Turkmanchai set the stage for ruinous levels of foreign 
influence in the form of Russian commercial interests.  After another military defeat years later, 
England would be granted the same rights as Russia.  Napoleon’s ambitions and Fath Ali Shah’s 
irredentist policies were the impetus for a long chain of events that brought about over a century 
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of foreign influence in Iran.  This chain ended with the partitioning of the majority of Iranian 
territory at the end of the nineteenth century between British and Russian spheres of influence.  
Then, in 1941, the Soviets and British again occupied Iranian territory when Reza Shah Pahlavi, 
the new modernizing monarch lifted to power by the British, supported the Axis powers in the 
Second World War.  Though the British withdrew at the end of the war, the Soviet Union only 
did so when faced with threats from the United States.  Mohammad Reza’s ascent to the throne 
only transpired at the sufferance of the British and Americans, who believed he would be far 
more malleable than his father.23
This disastrous and repeated history helped form the Shah’s perception that the greatest 
existential threat to Iran and the perseverance of his rule was the Soviet Union.  The traditional 
Persian sentiment in this regard is perhaps best summarized by Fath Ali Shah: “as long as one 
square inch of Persian soil remains in the possession of the Russian empire, we shall be 
enemies.” 24  While Fath Ali Shah’s failings kept Iran always one step behind the protean alliance 
systems of the European powers that continued to betray and exploit his trust, Mohammad Reza 
Shah was competent and committed; he navigated diplomatic and geopolitical situations with 
alacrity and positioned Iran as a nation with great potential power and influence.
The Shah’s attentions, until the 1970 death of Nasser, were divided between Soviet and 
Arab threats.  Both constituted what he considered to be existential threats to the continuation of 
Iranian dominance and sovereignty in the Persian Gulf.  One of the constants in Iranian foreign 
policy during the 1970s was a “deep seated mistrust of Moscow;” the Shah was certain that the 
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Kremlin’s ultimate goal was an extension of its hegemony into the Persian Gulf.25  The USSR 
had the capability to wipe Iran off the map, while Egypt, under the radical regime of Nasser, 
might galvanize the Arab world against the pro-West, conservative, Persian Shah.  Iran’s 
Khuzestan province in Southwest Iran was home to a majority Arab population, and the Shah 
maintained a constant fear of radical Arab subversion in the region.  Once the Shah’s fears of 
Soviet invasion shifted to the threat of a united Arab force, he realized that Iran needed to be 
militarily independent from the United States.  The Shah was convinced that, in their 
underestimation of the threat posed by Nasser, the Americans would not support him should 
Nasser’s rhetorical campaign lead to actual hostilities.  These fears were reinforced during the 
Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965; the Shah watched despondently as the United States withheld 
arms from Pakistan.26  From 1965 to 1968, the Shah engineered closer ties with the USSR to 
ensure a variety of arms sources in the event of wavering support from Washington.
Iran’s rapprochement with the Soviets was to be short lived.  In 1968 the USSR began 
supporting the aggressive and radical Ba’ath regime under Hassan Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein 
in Iraq while Baghdad began permitting the Soviet navy to utilize Iraqi harbors on the Persian 
Gulf.  Their support for Baghdad, coupled with their aggressive moves in Afghanistan, the 
Indian Subcontinent, and Arab Peninsula reawakened the deep-seated mistrust of Moscow in 
Tehran.  Though radicalism in the form of Communism and Pan-Arabism presented the greatest 
existential threat to his nation and regime, by the early 1970s, the Shah identified Iran’s worst 
neighbor as Iraq.  Iran had relations both diplomatic and economic with the Soviet Union; 
however, as the Shah told Fallaci, Moscow’s manipulation of and support for the Ba’ath 
government smacked of a persistent “Russian imperialism,” made all the more dangerous by 
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linkage with a “Communist dogma.”  Iran was the “last bastion for the defense” of Persian 
civilization against the “pincer movement” of the Soviets to fulfill their “dream of reaching the 
Indian Ocean.”27  Not only was Iran and its civilization threatened by the Soviet push to the 
Indian Ocean, the Shah argued that the Persian Gulf was much more likely to be the spark that 
ignited the Third World War.  To reach the world, oil did not go through the Mediterranean, he 
argued; it went through the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.  Iran in the early 1970s had little 
hope of resisting a Soviet invasion for long, and the Shah believed that “the noncommunist world 
would hardly sit there with their hands folded,” nor could they accept the disappearance of Iran, 
because to lose Iran was “to lose everything.”  The Shah wanted to establish Iran’s place in the 
West’s security plans and to continue addressing its vulnerability through military expansion, 
extension of its influence into the Indian Ocean, and the achievement of a monopoly of force 
over the Persian Gulf.28
Though the Shah viewed the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to his hegemonic 
aspirations, he was also heavily influenced by his persistent mistrust of Iran’s British and 
American allies.  The Shah’s two immediate predecessors, his father and the last Qajar shah, 
were both cast down from their thrones by foreign powers.  The Shah understood that his 
ascension to the throne, his continued reign after 1953, and the legitimacy of the dynasty 
founded by his father all rested on a history of American and British intervention.  In 1953, when 
the nationalism of Mohammad Mossadeq threatened their oil interests, the British intervened, 
engineering a CIA orchestrated coup to remove the prime minister from office and place the 
Iranian destiny once again in the hands of a Pahlavi: the young Shah.29
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Because of his path to power, the Shah was very concerned with the apparent legitimacy 
of his regime as well as its security.  In his speeches and writings of the 1960s, he highlighted the 
roots of the name Pahlavi, which he said was “called after the name of an ancient form of our 
Persian language.”30  In truth, the Pahlavi dynastic nomenclature was far less grand.  In 1923, 
before declaring himself Shah, Reza Khan adopted the Pahlavi name because, in order to hold 
the post of prime minister, he needed to have a surname.31  By co-opting the surname, Reza was 
able to connect his dynasty to something grander than his humble lineage as army officer with 
roots in the peasantry.  He thus added a layer to Pahlavi legitimacy that was maintained through 
the force and power of his personal authority.  Mohammad Reza Shah’s keen awareness of his 
regime’s dynastic origins and his concern for its continued legitimacy and security is evidenced 
by his vigorous pursuit of greatness and his persistent campaign to establish identities for himself 
that would cement him – both in the eyes of his people and those of foreign powers – as an 
indispensable and dominant component of the Iranian state.
Though the United States was a crucial ally for Iran after 1953, the Shah did not grant 
complete trust to his friends in Washington.  If they had disposed of Mossadeq when his goals 
departed with American interests, they could do the same to the Shah.  He maintained close 
relationships with American presidents, especially with Eisenhower and Nixon, the latter of 
whom visited Iran on several occasions and corresponded regularly with the Shah.  Despite this 
continued amiable relationship, the Shah remained uncertain of the resolution and commitment 
of his American allies; he was determined to prevent the visitation of further deprivations upon 
Iranian national sovereignty.  To this end, the Shah set out to make Iran a nation state with a 
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formidable military and with its fist clenched about the artery that pumped the lifeblood of 
modern civilization – the oil of the Persian Gulf.
The Shah feared that the United States would abstain or withdraw assistance to Iran in the 
event of a regional war not involving the Soviet Union.  In addition to these fears, the Nixon 
Doctrine, which declared that “in cases involving [non-nuclear] aggression, [the United States] 
shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty 
commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary 
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense,” meant that Iran must create its own 
security to survive and remain useful to its largest benefactor.32  In the mind of a ruler whose 
own legitimacy was questionable, who wanted to protect his nation from the whims of the great 
powers, and who saw his people surrounded by a sea of hostile or unstable neighbors, military 
dominance was the best way to ensure Iranian security and make Iran the master of its own 
destiny.  The Shah was heeding, albeit unwittingly, the advice of Napoleon to Fath Ali Shah over 
a hundred and fifty years earlier:  “when your subjects know how to manufacture arms, when 
your soldiers have been taught how to split up and reassemble in a series of rapid and well-
ordered movements…when your frontiers are secured by numerous fortresses and the Caspian 
Sea has the flags of a Persian flotilla fluttering on its waves, you will have an unassailable 
empire and invincible subjects.”33  
The Shah whole-heartedly believed that Iran had the potential to stand among the giants 
of world politics.  With his sweeping economic reforms and the wealth accumulated due to 
soaring oil prices, he knew Iran would eventually “rank among the five greatest and most 
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powerful countries in the world.”  As the Shah predicted to Fallaci, Iran could, within three 
decades of 1973, “find itself at the same level as the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and 
France.”34 As the economically and militarily dominant nation in the Middle East, Iran could 
impose order and stability on a volatile region; however, the Shah would first need to establish 
the conditions under which the other regional powers could – perhaps grudgingly – accept the 
idea of Iran as hegemon and world power.  To this end, the Shah used public statements, 
symbols, and bold actions to link himself to the model of Persian kingship of the past and to that 
model of Neo-Patriarchy pioneered by his domineering father, Reza Khan. 
* * * * * 
There is a traditional Iranian proverb that “politics has no mother or father,” warning 
leaders against the mistaken belief that they can control with absolute certainty the vicissitudes 
of political life in their nation.  Mohammad Reza Shah, the second Pahlavi Shah, realized the full 
meaning of these words after ignoring their inherent wisdom in his implementation of neo-
patriarchal modes of governance that had been pioneered by his father in the 1930s.  The Pahlavi 
shahs positioned themselves, in a cross between monarchy and autocracy, as the fathers of 
Iranian politics.  The Shah believed that the best means by which to legitimate his dynasty and 
secure the inviolability of Iranian soil was to create a state that was economically powerful and 
independent, politically and domestically stable, and militarily dominant. 
The Shah’s model of kingship did not allow for the laggardly extravagance of the Qajars; 
it called for him to take “this king business,” as he called it, seriously.  The Iranian government 
argued that “to the people of Iran, the institution of monarchy is not a mode of government but is 
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rather a way of life which has become an essential part of the nation’s very existence.”35  The 
Shah believed that he could run the country better than any other person or group and so adopted 
a hands-on approach to dealing with the substance of his nation’s economic problems and 
reforms.  The CIA remarked in 1973 that “the Shah’s relationship with his people is a one-sided 
affair.  He tells them what he thinks is best for them... it is... a paternalistic system.”36  He 
jealously guarded his power and demanded personal influence in even relatively minor matters 
of state and economy.  In the Shah’s own words, “monarchy is the only possible way of 
governing Iran.”  For him, as monarch, to succeed in his mission to better Iran, he needed power.  
To keep that power, the shah argued, meant not having “to ask permission or advice from 
anybody.”37  The Shah believed that he had been chosen to guide Iran on a path to its great 
destiny.
The primary philosophy behind the model of Pahlavi kingship was neopatriarchy.38  
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi has been called a “modernizing monarch,” “royal revolutionary,” and 
“King of Kings.”  Through an aggressive campaign of development, social equality, 
secularization, and Persianization, Reza Shah, and to an even greater extent, his son, provided 
increased standards of living for the Iranian people.  This was a top-down reform program, 
imposed as a gift upon a nation that was expected to be grateful and politically submissive in 
return.  The Shah utilized his power to deal with very real issues confronting his nation.  In order 
to “provide” reforms in healthcare, land use, labor, education, and gender equality to a nation 
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shackled by a 75% illiteracy rate, he believed that only the “strictest authoritarianism could 
prove effective.”39  The language the Shah used in speaking of reforms is emblematic of the 
Pahlavi patriarchal model; he did not implement or enact reform, he “provided” them to a nation 
he felt should be thankful.  This was not a process of negotiation and participatory governance; it 
was a finished product of reform imposed from above.
A key portion of the Shah’s domestic reform was the elevation of Iran’s Persian identity 
over its Arab-Islamic counterpart.  Cyrus and the Avesta – the Zoroastrian holy book – replaced 
Muhammad and the Quran as national treasures.  Though Islam remained the religion of Iran and 
of the Shah himself, his campaign of positive nationalism and secularization demanded that faith 
be downplayed in the public sphere and that Iran find suitable replacements for the distinctly 
foreign elements introduced to Persia courtesy of the Arab invasions of the seventh century, 
particularly the importation of Islam.  In his writings, which were published first in English, the 
Shah took pains to explain that the “Persians did not completely surrender [their identity in 
religious matters] but adopted a new branch of the Muslim faith known as ‘Shiism.’”40  This new 
branch of Islam, he explained, is distinct and separate from the Arab Sunni faith.
Much of his regime’s failings were unknown to the Shah.  Living in the isolation of his 
court, he was seldom provided with important criticisms of his policies.  Few of his ministers or 
members of the Majlis were willing to offer opinions that dissented from what they knew to be 
the Shah’s desire.  His temper was reported to have caused even foreign ambassadors to “cringe” 
before his response to displeasing presentations.41  In 1971, the CIA determined that the 
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“fundamental vulnerability” for Iran was the “unique concentration of power in the hands of the 
shah.”42  He systematically removed political leaders who developed a base of power 
independent from his own and jealously guarded his role as the final arbiter of policy decisions.  
He secured his domestic stability by instituting social and economic reforms demanded by the 
democrats of the National Front, the liberal-nationalist party founded by Mossadeq. The Shah 
did not allow the members of the National Front a say in the planning or a hand in the
implementation of reforms.  
During his reforms of the 1960s, the Shah not only “took the steam out” of the liberal 
opposition, he also weakened the Communist Tudeh party by normalizing relations with the 
Soviet Union and instituting extensive socio-economic reforms.43  The traditional social base of 
power for the Pahlavi dynasty had been the clergy and the landlords of the one thousand families
– the aristocratic feudal landlords of traditional Iranian society.  In the Fall of 1963, the Shah 
implemented his White Revolution, which imposed land reforms and curbed the power and 
prestige of the Shia clergy. The Shah gradually eroded the foundations of his power; he relied 
instead on the masses of peasants and on an emerging middle class that was invested in Western
capitalist modes and beliefs.  Despite the opposition to his reforms, the Shah apparently reveled 
in the adoration of the masses. As he traveled through Iran following the announcement of his 
reforms, the Shah was greeted “with wild acclaim” by the peasantry.  The New York Times
observed that “the sour opposition of the landlords and mullahs and Teheran skeptics has not 
spoiled his enjoyment of his new friendship with the mass of his countrymen.”44  Despite the 
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adoration of the masses he liberated from a semi-feudal existence, the Shah’s conscious 
manipulation of his power base in the 1960s, combined with his growing isolation and ignorance 
of their emerging dreams and desires, had dire repercussions for the stability of his regime during 
the 1970s.
The Shah had, by 1971, succeeded in building a military establishment “capable of 
overawing Iran’s Western and Southern Arab neighbors.”45 At 255 thousand, Iran’s armed 
forces had 150 thousand more soldiers than Iraq and 190 thousand more than Saudi Arabia.46
Despite its dominance, that military absorbed over ten percent of the GNP and continued to 
demand more.  The expansion of this already enormous military budget was funded by the oil 
revolution of the mid 1970s.  Because he believed that the military was indispensable to his 
regime’s stability, the success of the White Revolution, and the expansion of Iranian gains on the 
world stage, the Shah treated his soldiers especially well.  He provided the military with the most 
advanced equipment and training available and ensured that their pay and perquisites were 
generous.47  The loyalty of his well-trained and well-funded military was a cornerstone of the 
Shah’s domestic, regional, and international policy.
In addition to his growing economic and military power, the Shah also began a 
committed rhetorical campaign in his nation and in the international arena designed to 
accomplish the task of connecting himself in the minds of his people and the world with the 
Persian legacy of power and dominance in the Persian Gulf.  In Mission for My Country, 
published in 1961, the Shah devoted a sizeable portion of the text to Iran’s grand history.  In 
writing of Cyrus the Great, who had founded the Persian Empire 2500 years earlier, the Shah 
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claimed that Cyrus “united all of modern Iran under his own rule… [and] established one of the 
world’s first nation-states.”48  The Shah then explains how Cyrus went on to create the empire 
that became the greatest the world had ever seen.  This account of Cyrus does more than repeat 
ancient history; it establishes the precedent for an ancient nation-state – a European concept that 
did not emerge until 1648 – in the same geographical location of the modern Iranian-Pahlavi 
nation-state.  The Shah’s account of Cyrus mirrors his own plans for Iran in the twentieth 
century.  Like a latter-day Cyrus the Great, the Shah aimed to first unite the Iranian people under 
a strong, modern, and secular nation-state, then to work aggressively to expand his power 
internationally.
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rhetoric during the 1970s was filled with attempts to connect 
himself to this inheritance, particularly to the memory of Cyrus the Great. He presented himself 
as heir not only to the power and prestige of Cyrus the Great but to the idea and mythology of the 
man.  The Shah’s inheritance from Cyrus included more than Persia’s regional dominance.  In 
Mission for My Country, the Shah explains that “the empire of Cyrus the Great was not based on 
territorial acquisition alone, but also on international tolerance and understanding.  The rights of 
all the subject nations were upheld, and their laws and customs respected.  Indeed, I see in our 
first empire something of the spirit of the United Nations of nearly 2500 years later.”49 This 
inheritance included the memory of the Cyrus Cylinder, an artifact that is perhaps the first code 
of human rights.  The memory of this code, created by the founder and hero of Persian might, 
persisted throughout the Middle East and certainly in the mind of the Shah.  In the words of the 
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poet Sultan Farrukh Hablul Matin, Cyrus “launched an Empire based not on physical might, /
But on the vision of a family of nations / Linked by bands of Humanity, truth, and right.”50
The Shah’s government continuously connected the Pahlavi dynasty with the ancestral 
line of Cyrus the Great.  The official line from Tehran was that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
“revolutionized the face of the nation.  The dormant Persian genius was once again manifest.  
The sons of Cyrus had come into their own – in the 20th Century.”51  The connection between 
ancient grandeur and present potential did more than simply link dynasties and establish 
legitimacy; it suggested that Mohammad Reza Shah alone could usher in a return to Persian 
success and prosperity on the world stage.  Out of the ashes of colonialism, failure, and 
humiliation a new shah had risen, and he had a plan for Iran.
On October 27, 1967, following in the footsteps of Napoleon, whom he greatly admired, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi crowned himself Shah of Iran twenty six years after his accession to 
the throne.  His self-coronation symbolized the Shah’s transformation from a young 
constitutional monarch, placed on his throne and kept there through the muscle of foreign 
powers, into an absolutist monarch stable on a throne he had built for himself.  The Shah used 
the domestic power base he created with successful social and economic reforms to launch an 
activist foreign policy beginning in the late 1960s aimed at extending Iranian influence 
globally.52
Once the Shah had determined that the principal threats to his regime were the 
vulnerability of Iran’s economy to foreign interference and the danger of radical subversion that 
this created, he began his White Revolution.  The revolution was “white” rather than “red” 
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because the Shah argued that Iran did not need a communist revolution from below.  In Iran, the 
paternalistic shah provided his people with a revolution of his own design.  This distinction is 
slightly strange, considering that, many of the thirteen points of the Shah’s White Revolution 
“can be found almost word for word in the Communist Manifesto of 1848.”53  The Revolution of 
the Shah and People, as the White Revolution was also known, brought real social and economic 
reform to Iran.  Though he made overtures to political and electoral reform, the revolution’s 
obvious focus was on the socioeconomic rights that the Soviet Union argued for on the 
international stage.  The revolution did not bring political equality and true freedom of speech to 
Iran; however, its reforms should not be so easily discarded.  The revolution brought relief to a 
nation and economy that sorely needed it.  The Shah implemented programs that brought Iran out 
of a traditional society dominated by landowners known as The Thousand Families.  By 1975, 
“over 12 million persons…had become owners of land, where before they were actually living in 
bondage and in feudal servitude to landowners who lived in Tehran.”54  This first program of 
land reform was perhaps the most important in the Shah’s effort to advance Iranian society into 
the modern world.  Beyond economic and social reforms, the Shah enfranchised women in Iran.  
Beginning in 1963, women were given full franchise rights.  Reza Shah removed their veils in 
1935, and his son encouraged their participation in government and education.  Female students 
increased from 506,000 to well over a million between 1963 and 1978.  Further, the number of 
women in higher education rose from 3,839 in 1962 to 28,869 in 1972.55  The White Revolution 
heralded the Shah’s ambitious plans for his burgeoning nation both at home and abroad.  
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This revolution also had an international component.  In his international speeches and 
university addresses abroad, the Shah pointed to the continued disparity between the rich and 
poor countries.  He pointed to the fact that though living standards in a poor nation and a rich one
may be “centuries apart,” traveling time between the two had decreased to a matter of hours.  
During the 1960s international development resulted in a “greater awakening and restlessness 
among the deprived people of the world.”56 As early as 1964, the Shah was utilizing the rhetoric 
of national development and socio-economic rights to connect his nation’s domestic struggle 
with the international struggle of the Third World, Post-Colonial nations to achieve parity with 
the global North.
Not only did the newly confident monarch increase Iran’s ties to Afghanistan, India, and 
Pakistan, he inserted himself in East African politics through economic deals and, beginning in 
1967, the Shah visited various non-aligned and Western-oriented countries, expounding the 
virtues of his reform and development programs as part of a plan to expand his regional 
influence.57  In January 1968, the Shah set out on a tour of Southeast Asia where he gave several 
speeches at universities and legislatures.  In these speeches, he did two things.  First, he drew 
clear connections between the heritage of the host nation and that of Iran to highlight similarities 
and minimize difference.  The Shah began his speech to the Malaysian legislature with the 
sentiment that his visit to the country was “a continuation of the ties” that linked the two nations 
“over the last thousand years.”  The Shah told the legislature that the message he brought was a
message “from a friend of long standing.”58  At the University of Bangkok he remarked that it 
was a source of pleasure to “recall that the bonds of cultural and social relationship between our 
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two nations date much further back than the present bonds… three centuries ago, diplomatic and 
cultural missions were exchanged between Iran and Thailand… thousands of Iranians lived in 
the capital of Thailand, and enjoyed the confidence and regard of the King and the people.”  The 
Shah recalled the names of two Thai-born Iranians that had served as Chief Minister of Thailand.  
He told the audience that he was merely recalling these anecdotes to point out that theirs was a 
“deep relationship of very long standing, one which naturally prepares the ground for an even 
more extensive and useful relationship.”59  Second, he vigorously promoted the ideals of 
economic and social rights – especially the right to national development – that he had pioneered 
domestically during the White Revolution.  This is a fascinating moment.  The Shah was 
exporting the ideas of his revolution internationally at the very time that the African and Asian 
nations, which had proliferated during decolonization, were turning towards authoritarian modes 
of governance and finding their voice and power on the world stage of the United Nations.
When the first International Conference on Human Rights was held in Tehran during the 
same year, the Shah found himself hosting a group of leaders, the majority of whom shared 
Iran’s model of government and a similar history of Western imperialism.  It was the opportunity 
of a lifetime.  In his address at the opening of the conference, the Shah remarked that he believed 
the location of the conference in Tehran was appropriate, since “the ancestor of the documents 
recognizing the rights of man was promulgated in this very country by Cyrus the Great about two 
thousand years ago.”60  
The Shah believed that Iran had a right to regional superiority in the Persian Gulf, but he 
also wanted to lead the nations of the Indian Ocean into a new global era.  The CIA claimed that 
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“the Shah naturally expects that Iran will lead any grouping of littoral states” because of his
overwhelming military, economic, demographic capabilities and recent progress.61  In his desire 
to provide an authoritative international voice for the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, the 
Shah advocated a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and a “zone of peace” in the Indian 
Ocean.  During the 1970s, the Shah advanced an agenda aimed at creating a common market and 
security cooperation among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean.  He went on what the CIA 
labeled a “lending binge,” making international financial commitments that totaled six billion 
dollars to seventeen different counties in 1974 alone.62
Then, in October of 1971, the Shahanshah – the “king of kings” – of Iran held a 2,500-
year anniversary celebration of Persian monarchy.63  He invited hundreds of the most powerful 
individuals in the world to Persepolis, the location of Cyrus the Great’s seat of power and his 
tomb.  The Shah had much to celebrate; in 1971 Iran’s per capita income had risen to $350, 
showing an annual growth rate of ten percent, and he had redistributed most of the land owned 
by the aristocracy to peasants and national preserves while still ensuring that the aristocrats could 
build wealth through investment in Iran’s booming industries.  Beginning in the mid-1960s and 
into the early 1970s, Iran’s economy enjoyed an annual growth rate of ten percent; Iran’s 
industrial center was growing at an average rate of fourteen percent a year.  Thanks to the Shah’s 
literacy and health corps, education and healthcare were improving swiftly and infant mortality 
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rates began to plummet.64  The United Nations too recognized the importance of such a 
celebration; a 1960 UNESCO General Conference had “decided on a universal tribute to Iranian 
culture, regarded as inseparable from the culture and civilization of all mankind.”65  From this 
UNESCO resolution a decade before grew the elaborate festival of Iranian history and 
celebration of the Shah’s success.  For the whirlwind few days of the lavish party, Persepolis 
would be the “centre of gravity of the world,” and the Shah would celebrate his success and 
glory in his destiny. 66  The celebrations at Persepolis were purposefully removed from the 
“tumult of Tehran,” where enemies of the regime might disrupt the ceremonies.  More 
importantly, Persepolis was chosen because it was the capital of Cyrus’ empire and the final 
resting place of his tomb.67  While the guest list included such dignitaries as Emperor Haile 
Selassie I of Ethiopia, King Hussain ibn Talal of Jordan, President Tito of Yugoslavia, and the 
Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, few of Iran’s citizens were invited.68
In addition to his public rhetoric and aggressive reforms, the Shah was adept at utilizing 
imagery and cultural symbols to manipulate public perceptions at home and abroad.  Time and
Newsweek magazines described the event as “one of the biggest bashes in all history” and the 
“bash of bashes.”69  A commemorative almanac published by the Iranian government boasted 
that the emblem of the celebration was “composed of a circle in blue, the colour of the Iranian 
Imperial House, enclosing the famous Cyrus tablet, surmounted by the Imperial arms and ringed 
by 25 flower-symbols identical to those on the bas-reliefs at Persepolis and each representing a 
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century of Iran’s history.”70  The use of the Cyrus cylinder was subtler than other, more overt 
imagery of the celebration.  The government produced commemorative coins for the occasion.  
The gold coins featured the Cyrus cylinder emblem of the celebration on one side, while the 
other bore the profile of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, juxtaposed alongside the visage 
of Cyrus the Great.  The script surrounding this stark image reads “Year of the Great Cyrus.”71  
The Shah utilized this celebration to actively connect himself with the legitimacy and majesty of 
the legendary Cyrus the Great.
At the opening of the celebration, the Shah again evoked the long-dead emperor.  Resting 
his hand on the tomb of Cyrus during the first speech of the celebration, the Shah repeatedly 
reminded Cyrus, the “Great King of Kings,” that he could “Rest in Peace, for we are awake, and 
we will always stay awake.”72  He promised to forever preserve the “traditions of humanism and 
goodwill… traditions which made our people be the carrier of message transmitted everywhere, 
professing fraternity and truth.”73
As a CIA intelligence report from the eve of Iran’s celebration of Persian Kingship said: 
“nothing succeeds like a successful Shah.”74  As the economic success of the 1960s began to 
translate into military might in the 1970s and oil profits continued to soar, the Shah’s confidence 
and megalomania began to increase.  He built a foundation of perceptions for his domestic and 
international agenda that rested upon the idea of ancient Persian identity and a bitter historical 
memory of domination by foreign powers.  The Shah was committed to making Iran a world 
power and preventing it from ever submitting to the domination of a foreign power again.  When 
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the Shah considered the West and their supposed superiority, he was quick to remind them that 
whatever they had, Iran “taught [them] three thousand years ago.”75
During the decade after the celebration at Persepolis, the Shah would build upon the 
foundations he laid during the 1960s.  He had stabilized the Iranian domestic situation and built 
an economy that could compete on the world scale.  He had begun to utilize an international 
rhetoric of national human rights that would provide his regime support from a variety of Afro-
Asian nations.  Finally, he forged Iran into a credible regional military and political power that 
was less dependent on foreign support and less vulnerable to foreign manipulation.  This was 
not, however, enough to sate the desires of a man that had embraced a history of destiny and 
power in his mission for Iran.  During the 1970s the Shah built upon the momentum of the White 
Revolution and pushed Iran further down the road toward regional dominance and world power 
status.  This momentum carried his regime too far. In his efforts to realize his global dream for 
Iran, he became more authoritarian and further isolated.  He would soon realize the truth of the
saying that politics has no mother or father.  Iran’s international success of the 1970s was unable 
to contain a nation frustrated by the machinations of their would-be father, Mohammad Reza 
Shah.  
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Chapter Two
“Nothing Succeeds Like a Successful Shah” 1
Human Rights Rhetoric in Iran’s Bid for Hegemony
“To be first in the Middle East is not enough.  We must raise ourselves to the level of a great world power.”  
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi2
In the spring of 1968, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s personal rule and Iran’s domestic 
stability were at an all-time high.  This security, as US officials observed, was largely a result of 
his “conscious avowal of nationalistic policies” since the beginning of his White Revolution.3  
Utilizing his form of positive nationalism, the Shah was able to shore up his domestic base 
through economic successes, construct an image of himself as father of Iran, and present himself 
as a modernizer to foreign nations.  He was able to co-opt the nationalism of Iranian liberals and 
turn the pursuit of material wealth into a national mission that would distract from his growing 
authoritarianism and megalomania.  At this key moment of economic success and mounting 
national confidence, Tehran hosted the International Conference on Human Rights and the 
United Kingdom announced it would withdraw its military resources and personnel from the 
Persian Gulf. The removal of this great power presence in Iran’s immediate region was followed, 
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in January 1969, with the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine by the United States, which 
promised military and economic assistance to American allies but implied that those allies would 
be responsible for their own defense.  
By the time the new Conservative government in London carried out British military 
withdrawal in 1971, the Shah had begun taking full advantage of the promises of the Nixon 
Doctrine.  These opportunities and the Shah’s readiness to exploit them left Iran as one of the 
most populous, wealthy, and powerful nations in the Middle East.  The Shah was able to begin to 
achieve key security objectives and emerge as a rhetorical juggernaut on the world stage.  
Among the Shah’s security objectives were the revival of the traditional Persian dominance of 
the Persian Gulf and the elevation of Iran to the international status of a great power.  To achieve 
these goals, the Shah pursued four foreign policy goals: counter the threat of radical movements 
and ideologies in the Persian Gulf, secure the production and transportation of Iranian oil 
resources, challenge the primacy of both superpowers in the Persian Gulf, and emerge as an 
international advocate for human rights.
* * * * * 
Opportunity as well as the Shah’s convictions and goals set Iran on the course to regional 
hegemony in the Persian Gulf and leadership in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.  The 
traditional sense of Persian isolation in their immediate region, a result of the surrounding and 
often hostile Arab neighbors, contributed to the Shah’s imperative that Iran dominate a Persian 
Gulf with limited influence from foreign powers.   As a subscriber to a classic realpolitik
approach to international affairs and a believer in the long-term balance of power, the Shah took 
measures to establish Iran as the policeman of the Middle East.  For the Shah, the maintenance of 
a balance of power required that every major power should have its own zone of influence.  For 
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Iran, this was the Persian Gulf.4  The Shah’s immediate foreign policy goal was dominance over 
the Persian Gulf; this was Iran’s surest means to obtaining and guaranteeing security in a region 
surrounded by enemies, alternative ideologies, and transnational identities.   
Economic, political, and military dominance over its immediate region was not the 
Shah’s ultimate goal; Iran had suffered at the hands of great powers since the early nineteenth 
century; the Shah wanted to transform Iran into a great world power on par with the United 
States and the Soviet Union but beholden to neither.  The Shah hoped to utilize his newfound 
power and opportunity to extend Iranian leadership and dominance into the Indian Ocean.  The 
announcement of the withdrawal of British military forces from the Persian Gulf and the 
publication of the Nixon Doctrine removed the constraint of a great power military presence in 
the region while providing America’s allies a blank check to undertake regional initiatives 
germane to US interests.  The Shah, his White Revolution of the 1960s having saved the country 
from financial crisis, eagerly stepped into the power vacuum left by British withdrawal.5  In his 
efforts to establish Iran as the regional hegemon and a world power, the Shah undertook a variety 
of strategic foreign policy initiatives and utilized a rhetorical campaign aimed at making the 
emerging norm of Iranian leadership both conceivable and possible.  This was his opportunity to 
establish Iranian hegemony in the Middle East and to reestablish the Peacock Throne’s 
traditional dominance of the Persian Gulf.
Mohammad Reza Shah began utilizing a rhetorical lexicon of nationalistic development 
and glorifying Iran’s rich history; however, the Shah was a practitioner of realpolitik, and real 
security concerns lay in the path of Iran’s rise to regional and global power.  The early 1970s 
were a period of incredible opportunity for the Shah and his mission of making Iran into a power 
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player on the world stage and fulfilling the destiny he saw for his nation.  Though it had 
decreased since the end of the Second World War, the British military presence in the Persian 
Gulf had “in effect prevented Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia from competing openly for influence 
in the area.”6  Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman – all former British 
protectorates – gained their independence with British withdrawal in 1971.7  Once the British 
withdrew, Iran “took a more active role in the Gulf, relying on its own capabilities and indirect 
support from the United States.”8  Iran saw the British announcement as an opportunity to “assert 
its dominance in the Gulf and immediately revived the historical Persian claim to sovereignty” 
over several Gulf islands, including Bahrain.9  Iran occupied three strategic islands in the Persian 
Gulf and abrogated the 1937 London Treaty with Iraq, which imposed unfavorable border 
restrictions on the Shatt al-Arab river for Iran.10 The Shatt al-Arab waterway – the confluence of 
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers – is “arguably the most strategic delta in the world.”11  The 
aggressive actions and rhetoric of the Iraqi government under the Soviet-supported Ba’ath 
regime in Iraq, combined with the traditional enmity over this strategic river and shared border, 
made open conflict between Iraq and Iran seem inevitable. During the 1960s, Iran “balanced 
against emerging regional threats by forging cooperative ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 
and Oman.”12
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The Shah’s rhetoric during Iran’s rise to regional power status reveals that, in both public 
statements and private conversations, the Shah exhibited a pride in his nation and a belief that 
Iran’s natural place in the world was as a great power and hegemon.  Though Iran needed the 
United States for military and economic aid, as well as a balance against the Soviet threat, the 
Shah desired a Persian Gulf free of superpower influence. In a 1974 conversation the Iranian 
Minister of Court, Asadollah Alam, remarked that the Shah was “unrivaled amongst Middle 
Eastern statesmen.”  The Shah responded that he had “so many more aspirations… To be first in 
the Middle East is not enough.  We must raise ourselves to the level of a great world power.  
Such a goal is by no means unattainable.”13  In 1968, before the withdrawal of the British forces, 
before the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, and before Iran began its program of 
militarization and expansion, the Shah spoke before the United Nations.  He bemoaned the fact 
that “defense budgets, a decimal part of which could free humanity from hunger, disease, 
illiteracy, and poverty, instead of decreasing, have grown. And the power-seeking policies of the 
strong are hampering the execution of United Nations’ ideals.”14 After eight years of enjoying a 
free hand in its Persian Gulf affairs and sustained economic and military growth, the Shah 
addressed his nation in March 1976; his rhetoric was manifestly more aggressive.  In his 1976 
New Year’s address, the Shah referred to the “glorious path” of Iranian power: “this golden epic 
of modern Iran will be carried on to complete victory, and… no power on earth shall ever be able 
to stand against the bond of steel between the Shah and the nation.”15  He concluded his speech 
with the sentiment that “we know well and so do all other nations of the world that Iran today is 
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a powerful state whose economic, political and military might is increasing daily and which 
enjoys unprecedented international prestige.” 16  The Shah’s rhetoric and Iran’s growing military 
capability and regional assurance point to a proclivity for hegemony.17
The Shah was developing the military and economic capability to forge Iran into a 
geopolitical hegemon.  The Shah’s actions and rhetoric during Iran’s rise to power clearly 
illustrate his desire and intent to put Iran on the path to regional hegemony.  The context of the 
Cold War ensured that Iran’s American allies would support the Shah in the event of a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, but the Shah was unwilling to rely solely on the hope that 
his ally would do the same in the event of a war with a regional power.  As such, he set out to 
develop for Iran a military and economy that would ensure that Iran gained the military and 
economic capability to dominate any encounter with another Middle Eastern state.
In order to move Iran beyond the limited role of hegemon in the Persian Gulf to the more 
global role of leading the Indian Ocean littoral nations, the Shah needed to convince the leaders 
of those nations that Iran was strong and committed enough to lead the charge as they advanced 
their agenda on an international scale.  In order to establish his ability to lead, the Shah needed to 
do four things.  His first goal, and one that remained a dominant theme for the next decade, was 
to neutralize radical elements in the Middle East generally in order to prevent fringe movements 
from gaining popularity in Iran domestically.  Oil revenues were critical to the continued wealth 
and power of the Iranian nation; therefore, the Shah’s second obsession during the early 1970s 
was securing Iran’s oil resources and production.  Iran’s path to power would need to be paved 
with oil revenue; if Iranian shipping routes or refineries were threatened, the Shah’s power was 
not secure.  Third, the Shah had to successfully challenge superpower domination in Iran’s 
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immediate region.  Though he still needed American military, economic, and diplomatic support, 
the Shah needed to establish that he was not the puppet of Washington before Islamabad and 
New Delhi could accept the idea of Iran as a dominant regional force and potential leader in the 
Post-Colonial World.  In order to weaken the looming threat of Soviet interference and invasion, 
the Shah needed to successfully frustrate Soviet regional initiatives.  Finally, and perhaps 
unexpectedly, to establish the reality of Iranian leadership in the Indian Ocean, the Shah 
portrayed himself as a champion of economic and social nationalistic human rights on an 
international scale.  If the Shah could successfully demonstrate his power while appealing on an 
international stage to the desires of post-colonial and authoritarian regimes in Africa and Asia for 
economic independence and social equality with the West, the Shah could begin to establish 
himself as a leader of the region and offer an alternative to reliance on the Soviet Union and the 
United States.
During the 1970s, Iran possessed a preponderance of both actual and latent relative 
military capabilities; it certainly had the potential to dominate the Persian Gulf states, especially 
given the sustained growth of these capabilities from 1969-1976.  Kenneth Waltz determines 
power status on the basis of a combination of elements: the “size of population and territory, 
resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and 
competence.”18  Iran possessed an overwhelming superiority in each of these categories in 
comparison to other nations of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East in general.  Iran’s defense 
budget comprised 4.9 percent of its GNP in 1966; in 1968 this rose to 7.6 percent; and by 1971 
had reached 9.8 percent.19  Of the Middle Eastern powers, only Saudi Arabia came anywhere 
near the total military expenditures of Iran.  In 1976 – the year after the signing of the Algiers 
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Accord, and the year before the Shah began to face serious internal domestic instability – Iran 
spent $10.1 billion on its military, Saudi Arabia spent $9.8 billion and the next highest spender 
was Israel at $4.7 billion.  For its part, Iraq’s military expenditures totaled only $1,944,000,000.  
Only Egypt and Turkey could compete with Iran in terms of population and size of armed forces, 
but Iran’s GNP far exceeded any other nation in the Middle East, almost doubling that of the 
next highest, Saudi Arabia.20  Iran’s latent military power as the third most populous and the 
wealthiest state in the Middle East points to the potential for hegemony.21  
As early as 1960, the Shah’s concern with the growth of Iraqi power inspired by the 
Soviet supply of arms was evident.  He complained that “Iraq has only about a quarter of [Iran’s] 
population and a fifth of our land area, yet her air force is more powerful than ours.”22  From 
1965-1970, “Iranian arms imports averaged $146.5 million per year… by contrast, arms imports 
for… 1971-77 were almost eight times greater, averaging $1.15 billion per year.”23  In 1972, 
President Richard Nixon “endorsed the Shah’s imperial ambitions during his visit to Tehran… 
Iran now enjoyed unrestricted access to U.S. weaponry, and the Shah began taking direct action 
against the radical forces that he saw as the main threat to his rule.”24  His actions were a result 
of a desire to create a stable region in the Persian Gulf, from which Iran could emerge as a more 
powerful player in global affairs.
                                                
20 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1969-1978).  Estimates in USD at constant 1977 dollar value.
21 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, 1969-1978).  Turkey and Egypt, respectively, were the first and second most populous Middle Eastern 
Nations, with Turkey at 40 million, Egypt at 39.3 million, and Iran at 33.3 million.  
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo_pop-people-population&date=1975 (Accessed December 10, 2011).
22 Alvin J Cottrell, “Iran’s Armed Forces under the Pahlavi Dynasty,” in George Lenczowski, ed., Iran Under the 
Pahlavis (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 416.
23 Walt, 291.
24 Ibid, 291.
58
Iran in 1968 was situated between two volatile regions prone to Soviet influence and 
radical politics. To the west, President Nasser of Egypt had, for over a decade, utilized a 
rhetorical campaign of opposition to the West and of Arab nationalism in the form of the United 
Arab Republic.  These two ideological stances were at odds with and threatening to the Shah’s 
own goals and beliefs.  To the east, the Indian subcontinent roiled in uncertainty and conflict.  
After the removal of British military presence and the end of London’s mandate treaties with the 
Gulf Arabs, the Persian Gulf too became a volatile region at risk of instability and conflict.  The 
combination of weak militaries, archaic political structures, and great oil wealth made newly 
independent Gulf Arab states like Bahrain and Oman prone to great power interference, regional 
conflict, and domestic unrest.  The Shah was particularly concerned about communist 
“adventurism” in the weak states of the Persian Gulf and so acted decisively in Iraq, Oman, and 
in several small Gulf islands when communist incursion threatened.25  Moscow initiated several 
friendship pacts with nations in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, signing treaties of 
friendship with Egypt, Syria, and India in 1971.  Then, in 1972, the USSR concluded a similar 
agreement with Iraqi president Hassan al-Bakr.  The Shah viewed these friendship pacts with 
deep suspicion.  He considered the pacts, Soviet manipulation of the Afghan government, and 
support for the fragmentation of Pakistan as a “giant pincer movement” designed by Moscow, 
that would surround Iran with hostile powers.26
Though the Shah’s most intense efforts were in the Persian Gulf, his interests were 
global.  The West is predisposed to consider Iran as the eastern flank of the Middle East and 
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deem it natural that Iran would seek hegemony over the states to its west.27  In reality, as 
evidenced by his shifting security initiatives and military spending, the Shah desired hegemony, 
first in the Persian Gulf, and then to the East, in the Indian Ocean.  Iran’s foreign policy 
initiatives during the mid-1970s seem much more invested in carving out a leadership role in the 
community of littoral Indian Ocean nations.   In 1973 the Shah began a concerted effort to begin 
building a powerful navy and air force in order to project Iran’s power beyond its borders.28  In 
addition, the Shah expressed dissatisfaction with the superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean as 
early as 1972.  In 1972, Iran backed a resolution in the UN General Assembly that declared the 
“defence and security of the Indian Ocean would be the responsibility of the littoral countries 
alone; and calling for an end to the presence of big power navies and bases.”  In September 1974, 
the Shah embarked on his most extensive tour of the states to his east.  During his visits to 
Indian, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and Singapore the Shah called for closer 
collaboration between the littoral Indian Ocean powers for “collective security and economic 
development,” presumably under Iranian leadership.29  Iranian newspapers, which “usually 
echo[ed] the Shah’s views on world affairs,” heralded this tour as the “start of a new era in Iran’s 
diplomatic history.”30  According to The New York Times, American diplomats viewed the tour 
as an effort by the Shah to “enhance his image as the leader of an increasingly powerful nation 
that is ready to broaden its sphere of influence.”31  While in Australia, the Shah “advanced a 
proposal for eventual achievement of a ‘military understanding’ by countries of the Indian Ocean 
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area, including Australia and Iran.”  The aim of this security proposal was part of a larger effort 
to “persuade the United States and the Soviet Union to remove their naval forces from the Indian 
Ocean.”32  This concept had great appeal to the nations of the Indian Ocean. The Shah’s 
increasing forays into the politics of East Asian and Pacific nations and his rhetoric of an Indian 
Ocean free of superpower competition is a clear indication of his strategy “for making his 
country an increasingly dominant force in the Middle East and southern Asia.”33
Though Moscow was the greatest threat to Iran’s security, the Shah saw India as 
“basically aggressive, expansionist, and ultimately Iran’s principal competitor in the region.”34  
As part of his efforts to offer regional alternatives to alliance with the Soviet Union, the Shah 
began in the 1970s to improve relations with New Delhi and undertake campaigns to increase 
regional economic cooperation under the Regional Cooperation for Development framework. 
The CIA understood that the Shah wanted “Iran to be the leading, if not the dominant power in 
the Indian Ocean.”35  In order for Iran to reach this status, it would eventually have to contend 
with the reality of superpower presence in the region.  The Shah’s rhetoric and actions illustrate 
his desire for the eventual removal of both Soviet and American military presence in the Indian 
Ocean.  He began arms and armament purchases aimed at making the Iranian navy the most 
powerful in the Persian Gulf and at creating a deep-water navy that could project force in the 
Indian Ocean.  Despite Iran’s efforts at creating a naval force, the Shah wanted a strong US naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean as well as the expansion of the American naval presence at their 
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Diego Garcia base in order to keep Moscow from filling any power vacuum while the Iranian 
navy developed. 36  
The Shah’s concerns about foreign radical movements and their implications for Iranian 
security are perhaps best illustrated by the Iran-Iraq conflict from 1968 to 1975.  Iran’s actions 
clearly point to the Shah’s concern about the intentions of Soviet-supported Iraq in the Gulf.  The 
Shah feared Iraq would offer an alternative narrative to an Iranian dominated Gulf through an 
“extension of Iraqi support for subversive activities.”  His actions belie a growing concern over 
“Iraqi territorial ambitions in Kuwait and Iraq's general drive to be a major rival power in the 
Gulf.”37  The border disputes between Iran and Iraq were apparently initiated by Iraq’s assertion 
of its rights to the Shatt al-Arab waterway.  Of the ten disputes in which Iran was a party from 
the announcement of British withdrawal in 1968 to the beginning of Iran’s revolution in 1978, 
eight were with Iraq.38  Following the formalization of the Algiers Accord on March 13, 1975, 
no disputes occurred between Iran and Iraq until the Iranian regime change in 1979.  In fact, the 
period from 1975-1978 marked a high point in the bilateral relations between Iran and Iraq.39
The Shah was ready and willing to deploy Iranian forces across the Gulf to forestall 
forces of radical subversion that he felt threatened regional security.40  Since the 1960s, the Shah 
harbored Iraqi Kurds in Iran and by the late 1960s was, along with Israel and the CIA, arming 
Iraqi Kurd rebel groups to destabilize the radical Ba’athist regime in Baghdad.  In March 1975, 
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Iran and Iraq concluded the Algiers Accord to cease hostilities.  Iraq submitted to Iranian 
demands regarding shipping rights on the Shatt al-Arab River and Iran agreed to stop aiding the 
Kurdish rebellion in Iraq.  When the Shah withdrew his support of the Kurdish resistance, the
movement was swiftly crushed and the Ba’ath regime slaughtered those remaining in Iraq.  
Iran’s own Kurdish minority was a constant threat hanging over the head of the Shah’s regime in 
Northwestern Iran.  
In 1973 the Shah believed he had the power to “destroy Iraq in a few hours.”41  If he did 
have this power, it is perhaps puzzling that Iran did not utilize its overwhelming strength to 
destroy the rival regime in Baghdad.  Given the continued threat that Iraq posed to Iranian 
security – as evidenced by the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s – and the Shah’s mistrust of revisionist 
regimes, it seems more likely that Iran would have continued its aggression in an attempt to 
affect regime change.  Instead, the two nations ceased hostilities in an apparent attempt at 
regional cooperation; there is a simple explanation for the Shah’s willingness to sign a peace 
accord with Saddam Hussein in 1975.  Iran’s aggressive actions in Iraq and their cessation 
indicate that the Shah’s belligerence was an attempt to mitigate Soviet and radical ties to Iraq.  
The accord with Iraq established a favorable peace that secured Iran’s western flank and allowed
the Shah to focus his diplomatic efforts and military resources on the eastward expansion of his
influence.42
Iran’s foreign policy initiatives regarding Iraq also evidence a paramount concern with 
securing Iran’s oil production and shipping capabilities.  Iran’s largest oil refinery was located on 
the Shatt al-Arab waterway; it was already “within reach of artillery and mortar fire from Iraqi 
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territory.”43  Iraq’s de facto abrogation of the 1937 treaty and its assertion of Iraqi territorial 
rights over the whole of the Shatt al-Arab presented an unacceptable level of insecurity for 
Iran.44    In addition, Iran’s seizure of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb in the Straights 
of Hormuz was more strategic than expansionist.  The islands’ strategic location at this narrow 
point of the Persian Gulf meant that, if a rival power were to take control of the islands, Iranian 
oil shipments from the Gulf to the Indian Ocean could be severely impeded.  Iran occupied the 
islands on November 30, 1971, the day before Britain’s protectorate treaties were terminated and 
the islands would become vulnerable to outside subversion.45  Once again, the Shah intervened in 
Oman, which is located in the same strategic area of the Gulf.  The Dhofor rebels in Oman were 
supported both by Iraq and the Soviets.  Since Iran had seized Abu Musa and the Tunbs, the 
rebellion in Oman represented the greatest threat to Iranian shipping lanes.
Iran’s sudden shift from a net borrower to “the Middle East’s largest lender” is further 
evidence of the Shah’s international priorities.46  In 1974, the Shah committed $6.3 billion in 
foreign investment, loans, and a small amount of grants to seventeen different nations.  Of that 
figure, $2.73 billion was invested in Indian Ocean nations or Iran’s Middle Eastern neighbors.  In 
addition to promoting Iran’s own industrialization through increased ties with Western suppliers, 
these loans were geared toward “cultivating markets for Iran’s non-oil exports, promoting 
stability in neighboring countries, improving political ties with old adversaries, and promoting 
Iran’s influence and the Shah’s image as a world leader.”47  The largest non-Western recipient of 
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Iran’s economic investment was India.  Iran purchased $200 million in IBRD bonds and offered 
New Delhi $1 billion in credits.48
The Shah utilized his new lending program as a means to augment his political-economic 
strategies, and he withheld the ultimate decision-making power for himself.  The Shah’s loans to 
Egypt secured access to a Mediterranean port, while his offers to India were contingent on the 
opening of oil and industrial markets for Iran.  By hinting at the prospect of huge credits to 
Afghanistan, the Shah hoped to weaken the influence of the USSR and gain a say in Afghan-
Pakistani border disputes.  The loans not only gave him influence and helped limit Soviet 
expansion, they helped prevent regional unrest and radical subversion.  Iran’s loans to Pakistan 
were aimed at improving economic conditions in the volatile Baluchistan province.  The loans 
allowed the Shah to influence regional perceptions as well.  His aid to Sadat’s Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan helped minimize those nations’ anger at Iran’s connections to Israel and maximize their 
acceptance of Iran’s growing regional dominance.49  Finally, his largesse to New Delhi helped 
alleviate historical tensions with India and extend the Shah’s “influence in the Indian ocean 
area.”  The Shah was “anxious to be portrayed as a responsible world leader.”  His loans to 
developing nations were in character for the modernizing autocrat bent on national development 
and regional dominance; they cemented his image as a regional leader.50
Iran’s conflicts with Iraq appear to be a result not only of concern for the security of the 
Ābādān oil refinery and fear of radical subversion; the Shah’s fear of encirclement by the Soviet 
Union was perhaps his largest reason for confronting Baghdad.  In a 1973 conversation with 
President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the Shah expressed his regional 
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concerns and provided an insight into the intent of his aggressive actions.  He asserted that Iran 
was “preventing a coalition of the Baaths, the Kurds, and the Communists.”  He claimed that the 
Soviet involvement in the recent Afghanistan coup was an attempt to “push to the Indian 
Ocean.”51   He saw the same problem in Soviet friendship with Iraq and interference in the 
Sultanate of Oman.  In a 1975 conversation with President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, the 
Shah again stressed his concern over Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf, stating that “the 
Soviets are a real problem in this area. [They] are talking détente, but never [has] their military 
been stronger.”52  
Iran’s military targets coincided directly with the security of their oil assets and with their 
fear of an extension of Soviet influence into the Persian Gulf.  Internally, Iran balanced the 
evolving military situation through a proportional increase in military capabilities in relation to 
Iraq.  Iran rectified regional imbalance between itself and Soviet allies by strengthening 
cooperation with the United States on the basis of the threat of Communist incursion into the 
Persian Gulf.  53  Iran also appears to have balanced externally by weakening the Soviet coalition 
in the Gulf.  Reflecting in 1977, the Shah expressed his pleasure with the Algiers Accord; after 
an attempt on Saddam Hussein’s life, the Shah agreed that his death would have been a “grave 
disappointment” and that, “but for him, there’d have been no compromise over the Shatt al-
Arab.”54  In 1975, the Shah indicated that he “wouldn’t be surprised if our agreement with 
Hussein proves permanent.  Baghdad may well opt for a closer relationship with [Iran] and shake 
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off foreign, particularly Soviet, influence.”55  This statement is potentially illuminating; both 
Iran’s decision to begin hostilities and to end them seems to have been motivated by a desire to 
maintain the balance of power by preventing Iran’s encirclement by Soviet powers.  
In his 1975 conversation with Ford and Kissinger, the Shah claimed that the Soviets were 
unhappy with Iran’s rapprochement with Iraq.  He states that Sadat, Hussein, and Boudemiene 
urged him to allow Iraq a chance to “cut loose from the Soviet Union and adopt a more 
independent policy.”  At Algiers, the Shah was able to settle the border dispute and open “the 
way for Iraq to be more independent of the Soviet Union.”56  The Algiers Accord was the Shah’s 
attempt to weaken the rival Iraqi-Soviet coalition.  Through his aggressive policies toward Iraq 
from 1969-1975, the Shah was able to weaken the Iraqi regime and limit the threat posed to 
Iranian security.  By offering an end to his support of the Kurdish rebellion, the Shah gained 
increased security for the refinery at Ābādān while at the same time removing the threat of 
Soviet encirclement.  Iran-Iraq relations maintained a cordial tone and conflict was avoided from 
1975 until after Iran’s revolution.  
In addition to frustrating the designs of Moscow in the Persian Gulf, the Shah also 
successfully distanced his regime from Washington.  Beyond the Shah’s calls for the removal of 
American and Soviet power from the Indian Ocean, the oil revolution of the 1970s provided Iran 
an opportunity to challenge Washington.  Iran was able to assert its independence through 
America’s increased dependence on Iranian oil.  Oil production had peaked in America by 1970; 
unlike in the 1950s, there were not a variety and abundance of oil sources in the world, and 
Iran’s oil was far more valuable.  Working in concert with the other nations in the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Iran increased its share of oil company profits, and in 
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1970, nationalized the operation and control of Iranian oil fields.  The OPEC nations utilized 
price hikes to pressure the United States and Israel to end the war in the Middle East.  These 
developments, combined with huge price increases, led to “unprecedented tensions… in US 
relations with Iran.”57  The crisis was averted by an increase in economic ties between the two 
nations.  Iran was able to assert its independence from Washington on an international scale 
while at the same time recycling its enormous oil profits back through the American economy in 
the form of arms imports, which totaled $16.2 billion from 1972-1977.58 Iran, Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq accounted for more than one quarter of the arms imports in the Third World.59
* * * * *
As established above, one of the Shah’s primary foreign policy goals was the elevation of 
Iran to great power status and the establishment of Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf and 
eventually over the Indian Ocean.  His actions and rhetoric point to a desire for the removal of 
superpower competition in the Indian Ocean and the emergence of a collective security 
cooperative of the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean with Iran at its helm.  In the 1960s and 70s 
every single littoral nation of the Indian Ocean was either a former European colony, was still a 
European colony, or had, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, endured sustained and significant foreign 
intervention, occupation, or pseudo-colonization.  To the nations of Africa and Asia emerging 
from the repression of empire, the most important international goal was establishing their post-
colonial regimes as the equals of the white Western nations.  This was the region the Shah 
wanted to lead and position Iran to eventually dominate as regional hegemon.60  
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The Shah worked consistently throughout the late 1960s and 70s to make Iran a dominant 
force in world affairs, both in reality and in the minds of regional actors.  As he embarked on this 
process, he consciously promoted the nationalistic goals of the Third World through his human 
rights rhetoric.  In the international arena, the Shah utilized a variety of human rights rhetorical 
tools and concepts in order to increase Iran’s identification with the African, Asian, and Arab 
nations emerging from decolonization.  He positioned himself as a champion of nationalistic 
social and economic human rights that appealed so much to the authoritarian governments of the 
former African and Asian colonies while at the same time denying the claims of those in the US 
and in nongovernmental organizations like Amnesty International that his regime was guilty of 
torture and gross violations of political and civil rights.
In the spring of 1968, Tehran hosted the International Conference of Human Rights, 
commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  At 
this conference the Shah led the charge among Third World nations to challenge the global North 
in rhetorical message as well as geopolitical strategy.  The Shah proclaimed a doctrine of 
national socio-economic rights that was at once removed from the concept of individual liberty 
in the West while also rejecting manipulation and domination by the Soviet bloc.  
The Charter of the United Nations illustrates the strain between national sovereignty and 
human rights.  Article II of the treaty guarantees that the UN will not interfere in any matter 
“essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any” state.  Article I of the Charter states the 
necessity of “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion.”61  The same document guarantees self-determination of 
peoples.  The Charter, with all its language of domestic jurisdiction, was very clear on the 
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principle of self-determination, and it made no distinction between colonized and non-colonized 
peoples.  During the 1960s colonized peoples in Asia, Africa, and other parts of the world cast 
off the fetters of their British, French, Portuguese, and Belgian masters by means both peaceful 
and violent.  The new found independence of these former colonies created non-white nation 
states and drastically altered the geographic power balance of the United Nations.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights that emerged from San Francisco in 1948 
was not a binding treaty of international law; it was, however, a solemn pledge by member states 
to “protect human rights and universal freedoms.”  The declaration, which begins with the 
recognition that “inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” served as a 
testament of equality.  It was a document that validated the humanity of hundreds of millions of 
colonized peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.  By 1968, however, the decolonized 
populations had become disenchanted with the Western interpretation of human rights centered 
on the well-being of the individual.  The International Conference was a clear indication of the 
shifting balance of power in the United Nations General Assembly away from the European 
nations.  The conference was “the culmination of a shift from the Western-inflected concept of 
individual human rights… to a model that emphasized economic development and the collective 
rights of the nation.”62  
In his address at the opening of the conference, His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah
Aryamehr of Iran led the charge.  He maintained that “while we still revere the principles laid 
down in the Universal Declaration, it is nevertheless necessary to adjust them to the requirements 
of our time…the very notion of human right should consequently be regarded in a new light.”  
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The Shah argued that human rights no longer entailed the primacy of “the political and juridical 
equality of individuals.”  The twenty years since 1948 had proven that “political rights without 
social rights, justice under law without social justice, and political democracy without economic 
democracy no longer have any true meaning.”63  The Shah stressed in his speech that “the gap 
which is constantly widening between the developing nations and the more privileged ones is 
one of the most powerful brakes hampering the full realization of human rights.”64  The Shah’s 
rhetoric at Tehran appealed to the nations of the Third World; if they were ever to be free of the 
new economic imperialism, they would need to challenge the primacy of the West and establish 
norms of economic democracy and social equality.  By utilizing the West’s incomplete lexicon 
of human rights and manipulating it to appeal to a Third World audience, the Shah hoped to lead 
the nations of the Indian Ocean into a new global era.  
It is perhaps simple to compare the Shah’s rhetoric at the Tehran conference to the 
political repression that followed in the Iran of the 1970s and interpret his speech as a cynical 
attempt to influence the opinions of international actors and the perceptions they maintained 
about the Shah’s regime.  While this is perhaps true, it is only a part of the truth.  The Shah’s 
conception of human rights was influenced by the rhetoric of the Third World bloc against the 
imposition of so-called “Western” concepts of human rights on developing countries.  During the 
1960s and 70s the Third World and unaligned nations in Africa and Asia challenged what they 
understood as the remnants of the old colonialism.  In the United Nations they railed against 
apartheid in South Africa, US support for Israel, and the war in Vietnam.  The tone of the 
conference in 1968 and of the resolutions that emerged reflect the Shah’s own understanding that 
it was the denial of economic and social rights which were the true impediment to human
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freedom.  During the 1960s, the Shah imposed social and economic rights on a nation in crisis.  
With the human rights rhetoric he employed at the conference in 1968, the Shah justified his 
White Revolution and set the stage for its natural successor – the emergence of Iran as a true 
power in world affairs.  The Iran of the 1970s was to control its own destiny and guide the 
grateful nations within its sphere of influence; or so the Shah hoped.
* * * * *
The opportunities presented in 1968 precipitated a decade that was a fascinating 
transitional moment for Iran and the Shah but one that was also tragically flawed.  British and 
American foreign policy opened the door for Iranian expansion internationally at the very 
moment that Iran was making economic and social reforms domestically.  Iran’s unique position 
allowed the Shah to act on his constructed identity as the rightful heir to the ancient might of the 
Persian Empire. The Shah’s very real gains in military power and geopolitical security were 
accompanied by his conscious espousal of human rights rhetoric in an attempt to proliferate an 
image of himself as leader and of Iran as hegemon and world power.
At the same time its monarch was championing Third World nationalistic human rights 
as a means to make the Western concept of full political and civil rights for the individual viable, 
Iran’s economic, cultural, and educational ties to the West increased exponentially.  In March 
1975, the U.S. and Iran signed an economic accord in which Iran committed to spending $15 
billion on American goods and services from 1975-1980.65  Tens of thousands of Iranian 
students began attending American universities during the Shah’s reign.66  Removed from the 
iron grip of the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) – the Shah’s secret 
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police – students joined Iranian student organizations.67  They produced newsletters and 
publications denouncing the repressive Iranian regime.  Despite SAVAK’s monitoring efforts 
within the United States, these students held public demonstrations in front of the Iranian 
embassy and wrote prolifically to American politicians and officials, angered at American arm 
sales and increasing interdependence with the Shah’s Iran.  Young people in Iran began to turn 
back to the traditional authority of Islam in the late 1970s; they found solace and liberation in the 
oppositional rhetoric of figures like Ayatollah Khomeini.68  The Shah’s rhetoric in 1968 
expressed that “the effective realization of justice under law, of civic rights and of political 
democracy… constitutes in our time not only the national duty of every State but also the most 
precious gift which any Government can offer to the community of man and to international 
peace.”69  His denial of this tacit promise to his people made ashes of the platform of 
international supremacy upon which the Shah hoped to build his claim to regional dominance.
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Chapter Three
Deferred Dreams
Human Rights, International Rhetoric, and a Domestic Explosion
“If thou hast no sympathy for the trouble of others
Thou art unworthy to be called by the name of man.”1
Mohammad Reza Shah, quoting Saadi at Harvard University
On June 13, 1968, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi gave a commencement address to the 
graduating class of Harvard University.  In this speech, the Shah continued in the vein of his 
addresses in Southeast Asia and at the International Conference in Tehran.  He stressed the 
global need for economic advancement and social equality, specifically blaming many of the 
evils of the world on poverty, ignorance, hunger, and illiteracy.  To address what he called a 
growing “gulf” between the prosperous and poor nations of the world, the Shah proposed that the 
United Nations create a Welfare Legion to give individuals an opportunity to “devote a part of 
their lives to the service of mankind.”2  Though this was a powerful speech, its tone is typical of 
the Shah’s other 1968 addresses; he sought to connect Iran’s economic success with a plan for a 
global movement to rectify the social, racial, and economic inequalities left behind by European 
imperialism.  
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Though this speech was given in America, and was intended, as were most of his foreign 
speeches, for an international and Western audience, it had reverberations in Iran as well.  On 
June 12, 1977 – almost nine years to the day after the Shah’s Harvard speech – three men wrote 
an open letter to Mohammad Reza Shah.  This letter “was the first strong open criticism in Iran 
since 1963.”3  The letter was sent directly to the Shah, but 20,000 other copies were privately 
circulated throughout Iran.  The authors of the letter were Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Dr. Shapour 
Bakhtiar, and Darioush Forouhar.  All three men were leaders of the National Front movement, 
and all three had university educations.  Sanjabi and Bakhtiar had advanced degrees from the 
Sorbonne in France.  Forouhar was educated at Tehran University.  Each of these men, like the 
thousands of other university-educated Iranians, had ready access to and knowledge of the 
Shah’s international addresses.  Though the rhetoric the Shah employed in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts was designed for an audience of Americans and the United Nations, it was heard 
in Iran.  Students like these three men were perfectly capable of disseminating the content of the 
Shah’s rhetoric within Iran to less-connected members of the society.
In their letter to “His Imperial Majesty,” the three men explained their criticisms in no 
uncertain terms.  They reminded the Shah that no one in the government was capable of listening 
to their criticisms “since [government officials] possess no authority or responsibility, but merely 
observe the Royal Will.”  The Shah was responsible for the ills of the nation and was the only 
person to whom the three could appeal because all of Iran’s affairs were “discharged through 
Imperial writs.”4  They complained of the growing economic crisis of the late 1970s in Iran and 
of the Shah’s exploitation of the nation’s oil revenues.  But worst of all, they argued, “human 
rights and individual freedoms [were] being disregarded.  The principles of the Constitution and 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [had] been violated on an unprecedented scale.”5  
This state of affairs, they said, was accompanied by “endless promises and claims, exaggerations 
and propaganda, imposed celebrations and shows” that belied the “general disaffection and 
despair” of the nation.6  The letter warned the Shah of a younger Iranian generation that was 
“more than willing to embark upon actions labeled by the ruling apparatus as terrorism and 
treason which lead to prison, torture and death because they consider such acts as heroism and 
self-sacrifice.”7  Not only was the situation in Iran getting worse, the Shah had created a new 
generation that was willing to sacrifice itself on the altar of political dissent.
The letter did more than decry the Shah’s failures and deprivations as violations of the 
Iranian Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; it pointed to the hypocrisy 
evident in the Shah’s own rhetoric.  The Shah had been playing with fire in 1968.  His speeches 
elevated socioeconomic rights, racial equality, and national development; however, they also 
acknowledged the existence and importance of individual political and civil rights.  Sanjabi, 
Bakhtiar, and Forouhar addressed their letter to “a person [the Shah] who some years ago uttered 
these words at Harvard University: ‘the violation of individual freedoms and disrespect of man’s 
spiritual needs lead to frustration, and frustrated individuals are liable to follow negative paths.’”  
The three men reminded the Shah that he had declared that the only way to combat these types of 
frustrations was to respect individual human rights and to “operate on the principle that people 
are not servants of the government but the government the servant of the people.”8
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The letter concluded that the only way to redress the problems in Iranian society was to end the 
Shah’s authoritarian rule, restore the primacy of the constitution, revive individual rights, permit 
freedom of speech and of the press, allow broad political participation, and respect the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
This letter is the result of a decade of uneven development and uneven rhetoric.  The 
Shah utilized speeches like that at Harvard University to advance, as we saw in Chapter Two, his 
agenda of regional leadership on the world stage.  His calls for the Welfare Legion, like his 
rhetoric at the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran during the same year, was 
an attempt to influence the opinion of nations in the Third World, particularly those in the Indian 
Ocean.  The Shah’s words though, as evidenced by this letter from foreign educated liberals, did 
not stop at the ears of foreign officials.  Iranians heard these words, and during the 1970s they 
wondered why only half of the Shah’s international message was being fulfilled in Iran.  Within 
a decade the frustration referenced by Sanjabi, Bakhtiar, and Forouhar had exploded into a 
revolution.  The Shah’s messages abroad had come home.
* * * * * 
The international success of Mohammad Reza Shah’s foreign policy during the 1960s 
and 70s is evident in Iran’s economic achievements, diplomatic victories, and rising international 
prestige and influence.  In 1960, Iran was in the midst of political uncertainty and economic 
crisis.  In his efforts to make Iran a world power and hegemon, both in reality and in the minds of 
international leaders, the Shah achieved domestic stability and instituted sweeping social and 
economic reforms that made his regime one of the most powerful in the Middle East by the 
1970s.  He worked tirelessly both in Iran and throughout the Persian Gulf to counter radical 
ideologies like communism and Pan-Arabism; his successes in Iraq, Oman, and elsewhere helped 
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a more moderate, right wing climate to emerge in Middle Eastern politics.  He successfully 
secured Iran’s means of oil production and transport while acting as a leader in OPEC to both 
raise the price of oil and prevent an embargo against his allies in the United States.  In his role as 
an oil leader and anti-imperialist, he successfully challenged the expansion of superpower 
influence in the Persian Gulf and emerged to fill the military vacuum left by the withdrawal of 
the British in 1971.  Finally, he led the charge among the autocratic African, Asian, and Arab 
nations to challenge the individualistic political and civil concept of human rights with a 
language that stressed the positive national rights to economic, social, and racial equality in a 
global context.  By any measure, the Shah’s early domestic and later foreign policies were a 
broad success.  He set the nation of Iran on a course economically, militarily, and diplomatically 
to achieve his goal of hegemony in the Indian Ocean.  
While his international policies led to a stronger Iran, they also fed internal dissent and 
contributed to the Shah’s growing isolation and megalomania.  The reforms of the White 
Revolution in the 1960s weakened his critics in the more moderate liberal factions of the 
National Front and Tudeh parties and made religious radicals the next most viable alternative for 
anyone seeking a voice in the face of repression. In his campaigns to counter radical forces in the 
Persian Gulf, the Shah utilized the heavy-handed SAVAK in a brutal international and domestic 
campaign against what he called “terrorists” but whom opponents and international observers 
termed “political prisoners.”9  Though skyrocketing oil prices and Iran’s defiance of superpower 
pressure increased revenue and prestige, it also focused international attention on Iran that 
included pointed interest from human rights NGOs like Amnesty International and the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ).  The Shah’s espousal of a human rights rhetoric that 
elevated nationalistic economic and social rights as the path to full political and civil rights 
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collided in unexpected ways with the new social and demographic conditions caused by the 
White Revolution.  The collision of the Shah’s unrealized human rights rhetoric and 
demographic pressures contributed to the growing unrest caused by economic downturn in the 
late 1970s.  When the Iranian economy stumbled, Iranians, emboldened by their embrace of 
oppositional ideologies like Islam, Tudeh, and the National Front, used the Shah’s own rhetoric 
against the regime.  
In 1961 the Shah, when asked why he was not a constitutional monarch, replied that 
“when Iranians learn to behave like Swedes, I will behave like the King of Sweden.”10  Though 
he recognized political and civil rights at the 1968 conference, the Shah’s obvious emphasis was 
on the primacy of economic and social rights.  The rhetoric he used suggested that these types of 
rights were the basis for an appreciation of full human rights.  The expectation of Iranians like 
the leaders of the National Front was that, once the Shah’s positive nationalism produced 
economic and social rights in the wake of his White Revolution, political and civil rights should 
naturally follow.  In reality, the Shah continued to deny the full realization of the political and 
civil rights in favor of his revolution and the international agenda of his increasingly 
authoritarian regime.  The Shah’s rhetoric in 1968 expressed that “the effective realization of 
justice under law, of civic rights and of political democracy… constitutes in our time not only 
the national duty of every State but also the most precious gift which any Government can offer 
to the community of man and to international peace.”11  By the 1970s, however, political and 
civil rights remained, in the eyes of the Shah, an unnecessary extravagance for his people, who 
should have been thankful for the boons their beneficent father figure handed them.  The division 
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in the Shah’s international rhetoric between socioeconomic and political-civil human rights
created expectations within the Iranian domestic population that were ultimately unfulfilled; the 
frustration this caused contributed to political dissent and undermined Iran’s rise to world power 
status.
* * * * * 
The impetus for the Shah’s emerging rhetoric of national development coupled with 
socioeconomic human rights was the rapidly changing composition of the international 
community in the second half of the 20th century.  By 1968, the Shah’s use of this rhetoric was in 
full force.  At the International Conference of Human Rights, held on the twentieth anniversary 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Shah spoke to a fundamentally altered world.  
In the twenty years since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, African and Asian
participation in the United Nations increased exponentially.  At a 1955 Asian-African 
Conference in Bangdung, Indonesia, twenty-four nations – only six of which were African –
participated and gave birth to the non-aligned movement and the idea of the Third World. By 
1968 the Afro-Asian bloc had reached seventy.  This new composition of a United Nations now
dominated by the formerly colonized states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East changed the 
emphasis of human rights rhetoric in the General Assembly and at the Tehran Conference.  This 
new UN was more concerned with national rights – with making their young countries the 
economic and political equals of their former masters – than with the individualistic rights 
championed in the Universal Declaration. These nations focused on racial inequality, apartheid, 
and the plight of the Palestinians as vestiges of a colonial past and examples of why their 
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nationalistic version of human rights was the only path to the full realization of complete human 
rights.12
This shift in priorities was not, however, simply due to a geographic shift in power.  A 
political shift that was particularly evident in the Third World also forced a change in priorities.  
At the 1968 conference in Tehran, “more than two-thirds of the eighty three countries… were 
undemocratic.”13  The authoritarian leaders that dominated the conference were, like the Shah, 
far more interested in national improvement and modernization than with free speech and 
political expression.  Indeed, such rights could prove a serious impediment to the realization of 
their nationalistic goals.  To these Afro-Asian autocrats bent on ruling modern and powerful 
states, the policies and rhetoric of the world’s foremost modernizing monarch – Mohammad 
Reza Shah Pahlavi – were exceptionally appealing.
The language that emerged from the conference evidenced the predominance of the 
autocratic Afro-Asian bloc’s agenda.  Of the twenty-nine resolutions adopted in the Final Act of 
the Conference, seven specifically referenced racial discrimination.  In addition to such racial 
concerns, the majority of the adopted resolutions were echoes of the calls for national self-
determination, economic development, and social reform that the Shah made during his tour of 
Southeast Asia and in his opening address at the Conference.  These resolutions essentially 
called for the global exportation of the Shah’s White Revolution.  
Resolution VIII of the Tehran Conference acknowledged the “importance of the universal 
realization of the rights of peoples to self-determination” and called for granting independence to 
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colonial countries.14  Along with a strong anti-colonial message, other resolutions connected 
economic development with human rights and the realization of economic, social, and cultural 
rights.  Resolution XVII declared that “the enjoyment of economic and social rights is inherently 
linked with any meaningful enjoyment of civil and political rights,” and recognized “a profound 
interconnexion between the realization of human rights and economic development.”15  The 
resolution goes on to criticize the poverty of the “vast majority” of humanity and the widening 
gap between the developed and the developing nations.  It then called upon the developed 
nations to provide aid and resources to developing nations and for developing nations to 
“continue to make every effort to raise the standard of living of their people,” using all available 
resources and to reduce economic disparity in their own nations.16
Resolution XXI further connected civil and political rights with the realization of 
economic, social, and cultural rights and recognized the two types of rights as “closely 
interconnected and interdependent” – but not indivisible.17  In addition to these rights to 
economic development and equality, the Final Act included specific programs of development 
and reform already pioneered in Iran’s White Revolution.  The Final Act included resolutions 
eliminating illiteracy, the promotion of women’s rights, youth education, and children’s rights.  
The conference produced a document that emphasized national socio-economic rights, but it was 
conspicuous for what it lacked.  The only resolutions specifically relating to the improvement of 
political and civil rights not connected to racial discrimination were two articles which pertained 
to legal aid and the rights of detained persons.  The latter was co-authored by Iran.
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By the early 1970s, Iran had become a model for the Third World.  A 1971 UNESCO 
article proclaimed Iran’s return to international power status and lauded its positive influence in 
world affairs.  The article argued that in the United Nations, Iran “set the pace for other 
developing countries” and acted as a “centre where ideas and techniques may be pooled, to meet 
the problems of the less technologically advanced Orient with the experience and skills of the 
more technologically advanced Occident, Iran acting as the catalyst.”18  When several regional 
heads of state addressed the conference in Tehran, they were quick to acknowledge the 
leadership and fellowship they saw in Iran and Mohammad Reza Shah.  The President of 
Pakistan, Ayub Khan, noted that it was “particularly gratifying” that the “fraternal” nation of Iran 
was hosting the conference.19  The Prime Minister of Afghanistan remarked on the significance 
of a conference in the “brotherly country of Iran.”20  A few nations at least seem to have begun to 
accept the message of unity the Shah spoke of in his addresses throughout the Indian Ocean.
According to Roland Burke, the Shah’s willingness to “bear the [financial] costs” of the 
human rights conference played a determining role in the eventual selection of Tehran over 
European nations or more liberal, but poorer, African and Asian states.21  The Shah’s readiness 
to pay for the conference perhaps illustrates the importance he placed on the event as a part of his 
foreign policy.  Hosting a UN human rights conference in Iran granted the Shah the attention of 
the newly independent and autocratic Afro-Asian bloc of the Third World nations he hoped to 
lead.  He could connect Iran and himself with a vision for human rights that appealed to these 
leaders.  Hosting the Conference in Iran rather than in Vienna or Nice further emphasized the 
shifting focus of the geographical power that the Shah wanted to establish.  The Third World was 
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not limited to a choice between America and the Soviet Union; the Shah’s example showed that 
one of their own could rise to take a lead not only in economic and military ventures but in the 
enunciation of moral and ethical principles as well.  The attendees at Tehran were lavished with 
the best accommodations, a marked difference with Bangdung in 1955, when the availability of 
sufficient toilets was a concern.  The representatives at Tehran in 1968 were reminded of Iran’s 
new wealth and power, of its ancient history, and of the Shah’s success in transforming his 
nation, as they wished to change theirs.22  Though by the early 1970s the White Revolution 
evidenced great success in reforming and changing the Iranian economy and society, these 
changes were not without significant and unexpected consequences for the stability of the 
Peacock Throne.
Under the Shah’s aggressive social reforms and public health initiatives, Iran experienced 
rapid demographic shifts.  At an annual growth rate of 2.9 percent, the Iranian population grew 
from 25,323,064 in 1966 to 29,912,000 in early 1972.23  This number increased to over 32 
million by 1975.  Contributing to this rapid population growth was a marked increase in life 
expectancy from 45 years in 1950 to 53 in 1976.24  In addition to healthcare advances, the 
educational and literacy initiatives were among the most successful programs in the White 
Revolution.  At 30 percent, the literate population of Iran had doubled between 1956 and 1972.25
The dramatic rise in Iran’s oil revenues and industrial investment interacted with the 
population boom of the 60s and 70s in ways the paternalistic shah had not expected.  
Industrialization and population pressures forced rural workers to migrate to Iran’s urban centers 
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in search of employment opportunities.  Tehran especially was confronted with rising 
unemployment and underemployment.  Though the government insisted that the unemployment 
rate was only 4 percent, 11-12 percent was a more realistic estimate, especially in urban areas.  
Nationwide, the CIA estimated that about one fifth of the entire labor force of Iran was either 
under- or unemployed in 1972.  The sustained increase in economic investment in industrial 
capital-intensive projects created few new jobs and did little to alleviate rising unemployment.26
The migrating rural workers arrived in cities and were unable to find consistent and meaningful 
work; meanwhile, they watched as Iran’s economy continued to flourish with rising oil revenues, 
and they wondered why their poverty persisted and the aspirations created by the White 
Revolution remained unfulfilled.27
When the demographic and social changes created by the White Revolution came to 
fruition, the Shah had not only created a prosperous middle class and thriving capital economy 
but created a new urban population that would play a key role in the domestic failures of his 
regime.  Tehran was unable to accommodate the influx of former peasants, who were now more 
populous and more educated thanks to the Shah’s battle against illiteracy and infant mortality, to 
urban areas.  This population shift created a large and increasingly frustrated, poor, urban 
working class.  While the years continued to pass without these workers receiving the socio-
economic benefits the Shah had promised and which they saw the educated middle class 
enjoying, they increasingly turned away from his promises and began to seek solace in religion, 
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in their traditional rural values and institutions, and in oppositional ideologies like the Tudeh and 
National Front movements.28
In one particular demographic shift, the White Revolution was far too successful for the 
Shah’s own good.  In 1963 at the inception of the revolution, there were a million students in 
Iran’s schools.  A decade later that number had more than tripled.29  The increasingly educated 
and frustrated population of Tehran included university-educated students.  The Shah had 
intensified his father’s policy of sending Iranian students to Western universities in order to 
produce the population to support a technocratic class.30  Abbas Milani points to one Iranian 
student, Parviz Nikkhah, who was sent to Europe for education and returned to Iran “filled with 
the promethean fire of a revolutionary.”  Before long, he was imprisoned for complicity in a 
1965 assassination plot against the Shah.31  
The two assassination attempts on the Shah’s life are good examples of his increasing 
paranoia toward the ideological left and illustrate how he inadvertently made the religious 
community one of the only viable ideological alternatives.  Both attempts originated from 
religious forces, but his regime and SAVAK continued to insist that the assassins were the 
product of a leftist agenda.  This is illuminating in that it illustrates the regime’s belief that the 
largest threat to the Shah’s rule came from the left and moderate democratic forces that were 
influenced and controlled by foreign powers.32  The Shah believed these threats emanated from 
the Soviet Union, which opposed his regional strength and defiance, and from those ideologues 
in the West that rejected his vision of Third World equality and nationalistic rights.  Meanwhile, 
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the clergy, the internal threat distinctly not influenced by foreign agendas, were given a free hand 
that was denied Iranian liberals.
In 1973 yet another attempt was made on the Shah’s life.  This time, twelve 
“conspirators” were arrested.  Former CIA director and then-Ambassador to Iran, Richard Helms 
claimed that the assassins were “no wild-eyed radical leftists; some are very much solid members 
of the establishment… The upper class/intellectual links of the… twelve people arrested” speaks 
to the fundamental difference between what was considered a conspiracy in Iran and in the West.  
According to a journalist from Tehran’s Kayhan newspaper, it was “a crime in Iran to even think 
about killing the Shah… the evidence required to support a conviction of conspiracy is far less” 
than in the West.33
In his testimony before congress on September 8, 1976, William Butcher of the 
International Commission of Jurists reported on the human rights situation in Iran based on his 
observations in the country the year before.  Though he gave a glowing report of the 
advancement of socioeconomic rights and the enfranchisement of women, he asserted that “the 
Iranian Government has not implemented the basic and fundamental…civil and political rights of 
its citizens.”34  The Iranian constitution of 1906, which was still in effect in 1976, provided equal 
rights under the law to all Iranian citizens.  These rights “are subject to the proviso ‘except in 
conformity with the law.’  This is a clause which has come to mean ‘except when the Shah 
determines otherwise.”35  The 1906 constitution provided for an independent judiciary, a 
tripartite system, and for two political parties.  In reality, SAVAK had control over the entire 
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judicial process in the case of crimes against the state, the Shah kept tight control over the 
legislature, and in 1975, he eradicated the two party system.  In Butcher’s view, the Shah gave 
the Iranian people a stark choice: “A person who does not enter the new political party…will 
only have two choices.  He is either an individual who belongs to an illegal organization…in 
other words is a traitor…or if he desires, he can leave the country tomorrow…he is not an 
Iranian and he has no nation.”36  This increasing political repression collided with continued 
economic prosperity to create a situation where, were the economic prosperity to falter, the 
politically silenced would turn in force against the government.
Despite his development of modern economic and social institutions and governmental 
efforts to counter corruption, the Shah had never created political institutions that allowed 
Iranians a hand in the decision-making process of Iran.  The Shah felt the Iranian nation was not 
ready for this step; “the Shah firmly believed, even in the 1970s, that social and economic 
development must be achieved before he [could] permit the development of political parties in 
the Western sense.”37  The political parties the Shah did allow were little more than mouthpieces 
for the government.  The most powerful political party in Iran during the 1970s, the New Iran 
Party, lacked genuine public support because of its reputation as a puppet of the government.  
Lacking other viable political parties and facing an electoral system that was little more than a 
farce, the majority of Iranians exhibited a sense of apathy and cynicism.  Most Iranians felt 
participation in elections was little more than a pointless gesture.  The CIA noted in 1971 that the 
Iranian government used elections as a tool for “improving [its] democratic image” and for 
“giving the people a feeling of participation in the governing process rather than… allowing the 
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free expression of opinion.”38  It was this feeling of apathy engendered by the Shah’s policies 
that was most significant in his loss of public support.  Though specific abuses of political 
prisoners, SAVAK’s brutality, and incidents of military and police indiscretion harmed the 
regime’s credibility, it was people’s feeling of helplessness and their lack of agency in the 
political process and national discourse that caused revolution.  The division in Iran between 
social and economic rights and political and civil rights reproduced individual frustrations on a 
national scale.
The unfulfilled promises of the Shah’s international human rights rhetoric and the 
frustrated ambitions of growing segments of Tehran’s urban population combined with an 
increasingly dire economic crisis to foment political dissent in 1977-78.  The years from 1975 to 
1977 witnessed the emergence and growth of significant economic problems for Iran.  Despite 
his efforts at top-down state economic intervention, the Shah could not counteract Iran’s rising 
inflation.  As a result, industrial and capital investment severely decreased.  The regime’s efforts 
to stem the bleeding only created more enemies of the Shah in the Bazaar.  The nation’s healthy 
“surplus of $2 billion in 1974 was turned into a whopping deficit of $7.3 billion” by 1977.39  The 
Shah’s struggling attempts to maintain his revolution produced pressures on almost all segments 
of the population; “new taxes on the salaried class, forced price reductions for the entrepreneurial 
class, and the traditional hardships of the urban poor in transitional economies interacted with the 
more liberal policies adopted by the Shah to create a growing movement of discontent.”40  
Though he misidentified its source, the Shah understood there was a problem and began 
considering how to counteract it.  
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During the late 1970s the Shah considered real political reform.  He went so far as to task 
Mehdi Samii, a respected Iranian politician, with creating a new reformist party.  The plan was 
abandoned in its infancy, as an influx of oil money convinced the Shah he could find an 
economic, rather than a political solution to Iran’s growing problems of unrest and dissent.  He 
went further, though, and rather than creating a new reform party, disbanded all political parties 
and reinstated a one-party system.41  This frustration of true reform seems at first in keeping with 
the Shah’s international rhetoric that social and economic progress were the most important 
human right.  In reality, the Shah broke the tacit promises he began making in the 1960s.  He had 
repeatedly and publicly proclaimed that social equality and economic security were the rights 
upon which political, civil, and legal justice was founded.  Perhaps he did not portray the two 
types of rights as indivisible, but he did make the implicit promise that once Iran, and nations 
like Iran, had achieved international parity their citizens would then be able to enjoy a full 
realization of human rights.  Iran had experienced, until the inflation of the late 1970s, 
unprecedented improvements in the socio-economic conditions of its citizens.  Yet, the regime’s 
political repression and the absolute power of the Shah had only increased.  It was not until 1977 
that the Shah began making hesitant concessions, and by that time, compromise only encouraged 
further and more radical demands.
The Shah continued to misunderstand sources of dissent in the younger generations.  
When his Minister of Court and trusted friend Asadollah Alam tactfully attempted to suggest that 
increased political participation – if only at the local level – might help mitigate unrest, the Shah 
countered instead that it was wage disparities between the younger generation and the 
established professionals that was the sole cause of discontent.42  When Alam pressed the point 
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in April 1972 and asked what harm could come from allowing a free hand in local elections, the 
Shah exploded, “What are you talking about?  Of course it would be harmful…they’d begin 
moaning about inflation or some such rot.”43  
The Shah not only fell back on his socio-economic arguments for the unrest, he also 
continued his refrain that it was the agents of foreign powers who were to blame.  In the context 
of widespread student uprisings across Iran, the Shah claimed, “Moscow is behind it all.”  Alam 
meanwhile nursed the belief that it was the Iranian government that was behaving “like the 
conqueror of a vanquished land” in Iran.  The Shah and the university authorities flatly refused 
any sort of dialogue with the student protesters.44  The reality that organic internal religious 
dissent existed in Iran seemed to continue to elude the Shah well into 1977.  He claimed the 
religious opposition groups were in reality “Islamic Marxists, mere Soviet Puppets.”45  He seems 
to have found it inconceivable that his people would revolt of their own will; their father, the 
Shah of Iran, gave them all that they could possibly want.  If there was dissent, it must have been 
the product of foreign meddling.  
During his modernization campaign, the Shah had formed a tacit contract with his people 
– that full human rights would follow the expansion of economic and social nationalistic rights.  
Because of the Shah’s desire to make Iran a world power and because of balance of power 
politics, Iran embarked in the early 1970s on a path to become the guarantor of Persian Gulf 
security and stability.  This evolution of purpose from domestic to regional stability and security 
meant a postponement of the rights the Shah tacitly promised in 1968.  Full human rights took a 
back seat, first to national economic development, then to the expansion of Iran’s regional 
initiatives.  
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Reports of political rights and rule of law in Iran by the US State Department and the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) paint a grim picture of political, civil, and religious 
rights in Iran during the late 1970s.  Determining the exact and true extent of human rights 
violations in Iran during the period of its rise to regional power status is a tricky business for 
several reasons.  First, most NGOs undertaking studies of the human rights situation in Iran had 
to rely on expatriate and academic sources rather than detailed studies and first hand accounts of 
Iranian facilities. Second, NGOs such as Amnesty International and the Association of 
Democratic Lawyers presented cases of egregious violations that were dismissed by the regime 
as spurious and foreign attempts to weaken the international image and internal stability of Iran.  
As a result, access to Iranian facilities and approval of visas for groups conducting studies within 
Iran was often denied.  In the United States, the State Department in 1975 was cognizant “of the 
many accusations of the use of torture or brutality by Iranian authorities”; however, they had not 
“found any significant evidence to corroborate those accusations or to define the scope of such 
practices.”  The department also believed that due process was mostly followed within Iran, but 
that there were significant violations, “particularly if there is suspicion of terrorism, subversion 
or plotting the assassination of the head of state or other official.”46  On an interview with Meet 
the Press the Shah claimed that there were only about 3,000 political prisoners in Iran.  He went 
on to refute the notion that these were in fact political prisoners; rather, they were terrorists 
guilty of practicing violence.47
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In 1975 William Butler and George Levasseur of the ICJ were granted visas to tour 
Iranian facilities and conduct a study regarding the allegations “of a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of human rights.”  In September of 1975 as the two men began their visit to Iran, 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote to the American embassy in Tehran.  He expressed the 
department’s view that, though their studies were primarily in non-Communist nations, the ICJ’s 
reports were generally “non-ideological and objective.”48 As a result, their reports enjoyed a 
greater level of credibility in the United States than those of other NGOs.  The Secretary’s 
telegram advocated cooperation with the ICJ team and suggested the embassy should point out to 
the government of Iran that cooperation would provide a chance to educate the ICJ on real 
advances in human rights made under the Shah’s revolution, specifically in the areas of land 
reform, improvements in the lives of peasants and workers, women’s rights, and the development 
of the judicial system.  The report produced by the ICJ was largely a consideration of the Iranian 
judicial system and was published in 1976.  By 1977 the Shah had begun to experience unrest in 
his domestic population and so responded through limited juridical reforms to the 
recommendations of Butler’s report.  The ICJ report came alongside similar reports from 
Amnesty and the International Red Cross; however, it was the ICJ’s report which the Shah took 
most seriously.49
Even with reports like that from the ICJ, it is difficult to know exact numbers and extent 
of political terror utilized by the regime.  The Iranian legal system under the Shah’s regime was 
based on the Napoleonic Code and retained elements of its Islamic and Persian past.  For 
instance, habeas corpus was not recognized and SAVAK could detain suspects for extended 
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periods during its investigations. Though allegations of torture in practice were prevalent, the 
Iranian Penal Code contained strong penalties for ordering or practicing torture. 50  SAVAK was 
“bound in law by Article 131 of the Penal Code, which forbids any government employee to 
apply or order the infliction of bodily harm to any accused person for the purpose of procuring a 
confession.”51  A conviction on these grounds could cost the perpetrator three to six years in 
prison and if the victim died, the perpetrator would be tried for murder.  Despite these provisions 
for the protection of state prisoners, the State Department noted in 1975 that no SAVAK agent 
had yet been indicted on charges, and Article 131 did not specifically apply to SAVAK.52
It is also important, in measuring the level of violations in Iran, to note that the Iranian 
Constitution did not specifically guarantee freedom of opinion and expression in the press.  
Though publications were nominally free and censorship was mostly forbidden, journalists still 
had to follow the Press Law, which “establishes criteria for licensing publishers of periodicals 
and prohibits publication of articles against religion or the Iranian monarchy, of military secrets 
and incitement to resist Government troops, and of pornography.”  The penalty for the “use of 
offensive terms in public in speaking of the Chief of State” was two to six months’ 
imprisonment.  However, foreign press, even that critical of the Shah, was widely available in 
Iran.53  
The judicial and political systems of Iran were frequent targets of foreign criticism.  In 
1975 the Shah decided to dispose of the two party system – popularly known as the “yes” and 
“of course” parties – with a single National Resurgence movement party in order to “develop 
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mass interest in the political process” and encourage debate between the factions within the 
party.54  All charges of political crime were tried before military tribunals; both defense and 
prosecution representation were military counsel.  SAVAK had complete control over 
investigation and in building a case from arrest to trial; any hope of clemency rested ultimately in 
the hands of the Shah.55  Iran’s judicial process of the mid-1970s is in sharp contrast with the 
resolution, adopted at the Tehran conference with the endorsement of Iran, on the rights of 
detained persons, which recommends that member states, in accordance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, “review their laws and practices relating to the detention 
of persons and take all possible steps to insure that persons are not detained in prison for 
prolonged periods without charge and that the detention of persons awaiting trial is not unduly 
prolonged.”56  A June 1975 State Department paper on trial procedures in Iran made the pointed 
statement that, “the repudiation by its domestic practice of the principles of human rights 
publicly espoused by Iran is unfortunately manifest.”57  
Despite its knowledge of Iran’s juridical failings, the United States continued its 
economic and military support of the regime.  In a June 1975 letter to the State Department, 
Representative Donald Fraser inquired as to the state of human rights in Iran in light of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, which contains an amendment on security assistance and human 
rights (Section 502B).  That amendment calls for a substantial reduction or termination of 
military assistance – including sales – to governments committing  “a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights.”  The Assistant Secretary for 
Congressional Relations responded that, although the Department carefully considered the 
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allegations against Iran, its conclusion was that, while the Government of Iran “investigates 
‘political crimes’ and that there may have been incidents of harsh treatment of individuals and 
lapses of due process, there is insufficient reliable evidence to show that a consistent pattern of 
gross violations of human rights exist in Iran,” and thus Section 502B did not apply.
* * * * * 
The Shah’s White Revolution and the reforms it imposed drew heated rhetorical 
opposition as well.  Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as a voice of rhetorical opposition to 
the Shah in June 1963 in the holy city of Qum.  He offered a religious challenge to the rhetoric of 
the Revolution of the Shah and the People.  In his 1963 sermon, the Ayatollah established what 
would be the two guiding principles of his opposition to the regime: a hatred of colonial powers 
and a criticism of the Pahlavi model of monarchy.  He continuously criticized the influences of 
foreign powers on the Shah’s government and utilized a rhetoric of human rights that decried the 
absolutist king.  He recalled that though “the Soviet Union, Britain, and America invaded Iran 
and occupied your country [in World War II]…God knows everyone was happy because the 
Pahlavi had gone!”58  He warned the Shah that if he continued on his current path, which was 
against the teachings of Islam and hostile to the clergy, he would turn out like his father.  
Khomeini spoke with little obfuscation: “you miserable wretch…isn’t it time for you to think and 
reflect a little, to ponder about where all this is leading you, to learn a lesson from the experience 
of your father?”59  Though the Shah’s aggressive reform had quieted opposition from the liberal 
left, the hard-line clergy was emerging at this early point as a vigorous source of oppositional 
rhetoric.
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In October 1964 Khomeini again spoke in the city of Qum.  In his attack, he decried the
interference of foreign powers in Iran’s domestic politics and the Shah’s complicity in their 
exploitation of the Iranian people.  He took special offense at a new law that essentially gave 
American military advisers, their staffs, and families legal immunity from prosecution in Iran.  
Khomeini claimed the Shah only supported the law to procure a $200 million loan from the US.  
The law must have brought bitter memories of the historical concessions of the Qajar monarchs 
to the Russian and British empires.  Ayatollah Khomeini claimed that this in fact made America 
the “masters” of the Iranian people and “reduced the Iranian people to a level lower than that of 
an American dog.”  He concluded that Iran had sold itself, and its independence, reducing it to 
“the level of a colony.”  Khomeini purposefully portrayed the Shah as having embarrassed Iran 
on the world stage – a clear counter argument to the Shah’s own goals of making Iran a respected 
world power.60  The Shah exiled Khomeini not long after the Ayatollah gave this sermon.
The Ayatollah’s exile did not end his opposition to the Shah and the regime’s policies.  
Indeed, his exile enhanced his rhetoric.  In a lecture given in 1970, at the same time that the Shah 
was connecting his rule to that of Cyrus the Great and attempting to replace Iran’s Islamic 
identity with a Persian identity, Khomeini began calling for an Islamic government in Iran and 
connecting Islam with human rights.  Utilizing the memory of Persian history, he claimed that 
“at a time when the West was a realm of darkness and obscurity…and the two vast empires of 
Iran and Byzantium were under the rule of Tyranny, class privilege, and discrimination, and the 
powerful dominated all without any trace of law or popular government, God…[through 
Muhammad] sent laws to astound us with their magnitude.”61  The Ayatollah, like the Shah, 
recalled an ancient past that existed far before Western dominance; however, this was a dark past 
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that was haunted by oppression until the advent of Islam.  He warned that it was the “imposition 
of foreign laws” on Iran’s Islamic society that caused the nation’s problems.  The Shah was the 
symbol of these foreign laws and was apparently trying to bring Iran back to that pre-Islam 
period of tyranny.  Khomeini even evidenced the violations of Iran’s legal system, in which a 
person brought up on charges “may have to spend a whole lifetime trying to prove his case.”62  
In order to redress the violations committed by the tyrannical Shah, the Ayatollah offered the 
solution of Islamic law and institutions.  
The allegations of political repression and legal abuse drew harsh criticism from foreign 
powers as well.  Like Khomeini, the Shah disparaged international manipulation in Iran, though 
for far different reasons.  When confronted with allegations of political oppression in Iran, the 
Shah remarked that “in many ways Iran is more democratic than...countries in Europe.”63  He 
pointed out peasant ownership of land, worker participation in management, and the local 
organization and nature of elections.  The fact that he only allowed two political parties was not 
an issue of concern, because parties unwilling to accept the twelve points of the White 
Revolution had no place in Iran.  He linked the outlawing of the Communist Tudeh party with 
foreign intervention by noting, “they only want to destroy, destroy, destroy and they swear their 
allegiance to others instead of to their country and king.  They’re traitors and I’d be crazy to let 
them exist.”64  Such traitors to their nation did not deserve a fair trial because they were 
attempting to subvert the White Revolution and drag Iran backward, away from modernity, 
toward a return to domination by foreign powers.
The Shah found it inconceivable that his citizenry would be unhappy with him or his 
government.  In an interview he scoffed at the notion, saying, “what would you criticize or attack 
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me for?  For my foreign policy?  For allowing workers to share in profits…For fighting illiteracy 
and disease?  For having brought progress to a country where there was little or none?”65  The 
Shah’s reactions to foreign criticisms of his regime on the grounds of repression were often quite 
fierce.  He consistently grew agitated in his denials that there was any problem in his nation.  
When speaking to Alam in October, 1973, he referred to a BBC broadcast and expressed his 
disgust at Western liberal bias: “The bastards have the audacity to state that the chances of a 
revolution in Iran have receded, since our army will be able to crush any rising…What the hell 
do they mean ‘the chances of a revolution’?  Our farmers and workers are far too happy ever to 
contemplate becoming revolutionaries.”66  The Shah was often unable to comprehend political 
unrest in his nation and accept that it was a result of his people’s own initiatives and not the 
machinations of some foreign government.
Beginning in 1976, the Shah and his government launched a counterattack against 
international critics of his regime’s human rights record.  The Shah, his wife, the Empress Farah 
Diba, and his twin sister, Princess Ashraf, all responded personally to the accusations of foreign 
human rights critics in a variety of media.67  The government’s standard line of defense, echoing 
the Shah’s own words, was that the worldwide campaign against Iran was motivated by political 
opponents of the Shah’s oil policies.68  The government coupled its vigorous counterattack with 
a public relations campaign aimed at proving Iran’s good record on human rights.  In 1976 and in 
February 1977, the government opened its prisons to a British television team and to a Belgian 
journalist, respectively.  The British embassy in Tehran reported that the television crew found 
prison conditions reasonable and had even found a prisoner that Amnesty International had 
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alleged had been “tortured and crippled.”  The crew observed the prisoner alive and walking 
normally.  The crew’s report was never published in the UK.  Likewise, the Belgian journalist, 
who was allowed to interview eight prisoners that Amnesty claimed had been mistreated, 
reported the prison’s conditions and the health of the prisoners as “reasonably good.”69  Reports 
of this nature, however, did little to dampen international critics, and as international criticism 
and domestic unrest intensified, the regime stepped up its campaign.  In April 1977, in the spirit 
of transparency, the government tried eleven accused terrorists in a public trial open to foreign 
observers.  This was in direct contradiction of the standard practices in the trial of individuals 
accused of crimes against the state, which were normally held before a military tribunal in closed 
session.70
One of the most pervasive human rights criticisms against Iran was the regime’s policy of 
detaining political prisoners.  Amnesty International alleged that Iran’s prisons were so full of 
these prisoners that the government had to send many to army camps.  The Shah rejected this 
particular criticism primarily because he had a particular definition of political prisoner.  For 
instance, communists who were arrested were not political prisoners but common criminals in 
his mind because being a communist was forbidden by Iranian Law.  Though he claimed to have 
pardoned those who tried to kill him, he showed “no mercy… for traitors to the country…they’re 
people to be eliminated.”71  Moreover, when such people were executed, it was not because they 
were communists, it was because they were terrorists.  Regarding the death penalty, the Shah 
invoked cultural relativism: “here it’s right and necessary to shoot certain people.  Pietism is 
absurd here.”72  Just as he argued that absolute monarchy was the only way Iran could be 
                                                
69 Ibid., 10.
70 National Intelligence Daily Cable: Iran: Human Rights Issue, Central Intelligence Agency (15 April, 1977), 5.
71 Fallaci, 161.
72 Ibid.
101
governed, the Shah believed his people did not yet warrant the access to a full realization of 
human rights and would need to be led to that point by his resolute hand. 
In his campaign to silence international critics, the Shah had to walk a fine line between 
real reform and the appearance that he was capitulating to foreign powers – a tendency he 
categorically rejected in his own nationalistic self-determination rhetoric.  In June 1977, months 
before revolution, the government submitted a bill calling for reform of the penal codes 
governing the detention and trial of terrorists.  The bill included provisions that required the 
release of detainees within twenty-four hours, the appointment of a qualified civilian defense 
layer, and an open trial.73
Nearing the end of his reign on November 23, 1978, the Shah expressed his frustration 
with international criticism of Iran’s human rights record to Iranian academic Ehsan Naraghi.  
He accused those critical nations of manipulating a rhetoric of human rights “as a shield to hide 
their real objectives – of which exploitative contracts are only one example.”  These nations in 
actuality wanted to “establish their hegemony throughout the world.”  The Shah believed that the 
tactic of human rights criticism was merely a way to “bring those countries into line which have 
not submitted to their policies and which have tried to maintain their independence.”74  The Shah 
was convinced his international successes had drawn the ire of jealous and vengeful governments 
eager to redress the losses his victories had forced upon him.
The advocacy of human rights by America’s new President-Elect, Jimmy Carter, further 
emboldened critics of the Shah in Iran.  Small democratic protests evolved into larger and more 
radical demonstrations.75  In the same way that the shattered promises of the Shah’s human rights 
rhetoric sparked dissent, the frustration caused by the hypocrisy of President Carter, as a human 
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rights advocate, further fed the flames of revolution.  Despite the president’s focus on 
international human rights norms, in a 1977 dinner toast in Tehran Carter praised the Shah, the 
love his people felt for him, and that “the cause of human rights is one that…is shared deeply by 
our people and by the leaders of our two nations.”76  The strategic necessity of Iran in America’s 
foreign policy forced even Jimmy Carter to overlook the Shah’s humanitarian failings in a 
desperate attempt to keep the man in power.
Ayatollah Khomeini, speaking from exile in Najaf, Iraq, in February 1978, was quick to 
seize on international hypocrisy regarding the Shah: “All the miseries that we have suffered, still 
suffer, and are about to suffer soon are caused by the heads of those countries that have signed 
the Declaration of Human Rights, but that at all times have denied man his freedom.”77  The 
Ayatollah decried the miseries visited upon Iran by the “imperialists” first by Britain and then by 
the Soviet Union and the United States.  He specifically referenced President Carter as “the head 
of a government that has signed the declaration of human rights [who] says, ‘we have military 
bases in Iran; we can’t talk about human rights there.’”78  
In October of 1978, President Carter and Ayatollah Khomeini were in direct dialogue 
concerning the Shah’s belated efforts at reform.  The president argued in a press conference that 
the Shah “had moved aggressively to establish democratic principles in Iran and to have a 
progressive attitude toward social questions.”79  Carter claimed that this reform was the source of 
opposition to the Shah.  The following day, from his new place of exile in Paris, Ayatollah 
Khomeini declared his scorn for “the way Carter thinks.”  He dismissed what Carter called 
“efforts to establish democracy and find progressive solutions to social problems” as “crimes, 
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savagery, and repression.”  He scoffed at the notion that “all the strikes and protest movements 
taking place all over Iran were an attempt to evade freedom!”80
The Shah’s fundamental misunderstanding of the grievances of his people is evident in 
his regime’s attempts at judicial reform.  Simply reforming the manner in which terrorists were 
tried would not cure the dissent that was spreading across all segments of the Iranian body 
politic.  Political prisoners accounted for a very small percent of the population, after all.  In 
reality, it was the inability of people to control their own destiny that fomented widespread 
frustration and dissent.  The Shah, in the early 1960s, had set out on a commendable path aimed 
at bettering the lives of his citizens and forging an Iran that could act independently on the world 
stage.  To this end, he chose to focus his energies on a rhetoric of national development and 
socioeconomic reforms.  This approach won him broad international appeal and a temporary 
respite from political dissenters in Iran.  However, his tacit promises of political and civil justice 
for Iranians went unfulfilled for too long.  People in Iran had a higher standard of living and 
enjoyed social reforms perhaps unrivaled in the so-called Third World, but the regime’s 
withholding of any sort of agency in the political development of their rising nation quickly 
dampened enthusiasm.  Particularly, the belief that America and the West held more sway over 
the fate of Iran than did Iranians worked to counteract the power of the Shah’s nationalistic 
message.  
On November 6, 1978, an embattled shah addressed his nation, pleading for peace, order, 
and a second chance.  He attempted to co-opt Khomeini’s religious message, connecting “the 
national unity and the Shi’ite religion.”  He pledged to once again repeat his oath and to “make 
up” for “past mistakes, unlawful acts, oppression and corruption.”  At this late hour the ailing 
monarch promised free elections and the fulfillment of his tacit promise of a decade previous to 
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fully implement the Iranian constitution and establish fundamental freedoms.  He promised to 
divorce the government from tyranny and oppression and to run it “on the basis of the 
constitution and social justice.”81  His words came too late and fell on the deaf ears of a 
population that had for too long been denied a voice, had been frustrated by poverty in the face 
of national success, and had embraced political and religious alternatives to the Shah’s 
modernizing authoritarianism.  
* * * * *
If human rights are, as David Whelan argues, indivisible, then the price of willfully 
withholding one type in favor of the other can be dreadfully high.  This was surely the case for 
the Shah.  He failed to understand the pulse of his nation.  He did not see the impatience in his 
own people, whom he continued to treat as children despite the rapid advances of the 1960s and 
70s.  The Shah’s downfall was his insistence that Iranians could only be allowed a free hand in 
political and civil engagement once they had achieved the status of peoples like the Swedes and 
that they could only achieve this status through economic development and social equality.  He 
sought to bring his people into a modern and global age, but in so doing he gave them the 
educational, economic, and social tools to pursue political agency.  When this pursuit was met by 
the steel wall of SAVAK and the Shah’s own intransigence, dissident Iranians were forced to 
seek out alternative avenues of expression.  These alternatives abounded in Iran, though they had 
been repressed by the reforms of the White Revolution and the authoritarianism of the regime.  
Tudeh communists, National Front liberals, foreign educated students, and the Shia clergy all 
developed appealing alternatives to the Shah’s top-down authoritarian government.  These 
disparate groups found common ground in their quest for a voice in Iran’s future.  By the late 
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1970s, Iran’s population, particularly in urban centers had been exposed for long enough to the 
message of the White Revolution and the Shah’s development rhetoric that they stopped 
believing it would ever come to fruition for them.  They abandoned the Shah, and Iran erupted in 
the turmoil of revolution that created the world’s first Islamic Republic.
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Conclusion
Answer to History?
The Tragedy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
"I turn to right and left, in all the earth
I see no signs of justice, sense or worth:
A man does evil deeds, and all his days
Are filled with luck and universal praise;
Another's good in all he does - he dies
A wretched, broken man whom all despise."
                                                   - Ferdowsi, Shahnameh1
From exile in Anwar Sadat’s Egypt, a dying man, once a king, wrote his Answer to 
History.  The once-great monarch of the Middle East’s most prosperous nation wrote his last
words to history; instead of the resounding answer he intended, the ailing shah came across as 
“angry, bewildered, [and] confused.”2  The Shah still seemed astounded, even at this late 
moment in his life, that his nation, his children had rejected him.
In typical fashion, the Shah enumerates his foreign policy achievements and the close and 
lasting friendships he fostered with the nations of the world.  He points out that even in his 
regime’s darkest hours before the fall of the monarchy, he enjoyed broad international support.  
This is perhaps emblematic of the Shah’s misunderstanding of his nation, his people, and the 
sociopolitical conditions he created.  As later supporters who waxed nostalgic for the Shah’s Iran 
would echo, the Shah claimed that he had modernized too fast for the Iranian people.  He 
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believed they were too entrenched in traditional modalities and a feudal past to truly appreciate 
the economic boons and social equalities he lavished upon them.  He believed this was why he 
enjoyed international support from developed and developing nations of the world but eventually 
lost the support of his own people.
In truth, the Shah enjoyed the support of international regimes because he was an adept 
diplomat and strategist whose regime helped ensure stability in a volatile region home to the 
world’s most precious commodity.  Ervand Abrahamian argues that “the revolution took place 
neither because of overdevelopment nor because of underdevelopment but because of uneven 
development.”  The Shah lost the support of his people because he brought rapid socioeconomic 
advances to Iran that created radical social, economic, and demographic shifts.  These shifts 
destabilized the monarchy’s traditional base while creating a propertied middle class jealous of 
their material wealth and status.  The expectations of the White Revolution interacted with 
societal shifts to frustrate a population that was denied the realization of their political ambitions 
and a voice in the destiny of Iran.  Abrahamian’s analysis is adept, and is perhaps the most 
comprehensive history of twentieth century Iran available; however, there is more to this story 
than class dynamics, economic development, and material wealth.  Human rights here 
constituted more than a vague ethereal concept. The realization and denial in practice of rights 
enumerated in rhetoric played an integral role in contributing to economic pressures and class 
conflict to destabilize the Iranian monarchy and loosen the Shah’s iron grip on his nation.  There 
is convincing evidence in the case of the Shah’s Iran that human rights need to be considered in 
developing any security strategy.  Especially in the age of mass communications, the 
manipulation of international opinion and norms has the ability to influence domestic opinion.
The Shah’s international rhetoric collided with social, economic, and demographic shifts and the 
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political muzzling of his people to create a violent reaction against a regime and a shah that had 
broken a tacit promise to the Iranian people.
The Shah acknowledged the role of human rights in his downfall but he blamed “human 
rights champions in the state department” and the Carter administration for hastening his 
demise.3  He failed to understand the connections between his international rhetoric and domestic 
pressures.  Though they were the primary audience, the leaders of foreign nations were not the 
only audience that heard the Shah’s words.  Iranian students in the United States, Europe, and 
even in Tehran heard these words; the residents of a rapidly expanding and developing Tehran 
heard them.  In a semi-feudal society, political repression may have a larger viability; however, 
when the Shah instituted his reforms, he developed a population that either experienced, or had 
the expectation that they would one day experience, economic independence and social mobility.  
As the Shah went about his rhetorical crusade to place himself in the minds of his own people 
and regional actors as a world leader and of Iran as a hegemon, he put the existing pressures in 
the developing society under further strain.
In his efforts to develop Iran into an industrial power and global player in international 
affairs, the Shah utilized a vigorous public relations campaign in the implementation of his 
White Revolution. This campaign was coupled with an international promotion of the Pahlavi 
dynasty through governmental publications, rhetoric, and spectacles like the Shah’s 1967 
coronation and 1970 celebration of the Persian monarchy.  By 1968 the White Revolution, 
though it had not succeeded in completing all of the Shah’s goals, had clearly averted economic 
disaster and placed Iran on the road to success.  The Shah capitalized on his domestic success 
and turned to his international agenda, successfully connecting the two.  By adopting the 
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socioeconomic rhetoric of human rights embraced by Third World autocrats, Mohammad Reza 
Shah was essentially attempting to export the ideals of his White Revolution to an international 
community emerging from a recent history of colonialism in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  
He challenged the prevailing paradigm of western individual human rights with the values of 
national development, sovereignty, racial equality, and decolonization that prevailed in the value 
system of the Afro-Asian bloc of the United Nations.  
The Shah made this challenge because he desired to forge Iran into a dominant force in 
the Persian Gulf, impose an image of himself as a leader in the Indian Ocean, and of Iran as a 
true world power able to defy the United States and contain the Soviet Union.  This was 
consistent with the image of Persian prestige and monarchical power the Shah began to cultivate
at home and abroad during the 1960s.  He continued to cultivate this image while undertaking a 
variety of strategic initiatives that were closely linked with his campaign founded on the 
principles of positive nationalism and global equality. 
In his international rhetoric, the Shah elevated socioeconomic human rights, but he also 
argued that they were the foundation upon which the full realization of political and civil rights 
rested.  This constituted a tacit promise that once a people had achieved a level of social and 
economic advancement, they should be granted the political and civil rights guaranteed by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.  In Iran, however, the continued denial of true 
political agency was manifest.  This denial of agency to a society that had been led to believe 
political freedom would follow economic success destroyed the plan for regional security so 
carefully crafted by the Shah and his allies in the United States.  This case study of the role of 
human rights in rhetoric and practice in the Shah’s Iran is in part an answer to the calls of authors 
like Lauren and Ishay to incorporate a consideration of human rights into the study or 
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formulation of security initiatives.  It is also an answer to scholars like Forsythe and Whelan who 
argue that economic, social, political, civil, and juridical rights are all interrelated and dependent 
on one another; the removal of one undermines the benefits provided by the realization of the 
others.  Though the Shah wanted to and believed that he was providing for his people, he failed 
to understand this connection.  He elevated the right of a collective people embodied in the 
nation to sovereignty and national development at the cost of individual rights to political agency 
and justice.    
The Shah did not understand the indivisibility of rights, and he fundamentally failed to 
recognize the levels of connection and discourse between international rhetoric and domestic 
policies.  The examples of Mostafa Chamran, Dr. Sanjabi, Dr. Bakhtiar, and Darioush Forouhar 
are among a host of other untold stories of leaders and citizens, students and dissidents, scholars 
and clergy who heard the Shah’s foreign rhetoric, watched Iran’s economic rise, and waited in 
vain for political enfranchisement.
The Shah, his isolation and rising megalomania blinding him to the truth on the ground, 
failed to understand the dynamics of political unrest in his nation.  He believed radical leftists 
and foreign powers were behind any internal unrest in Iran while ignoring the mainstream and 
religious critics of his regime.  Even when he attempted to rectify the mistakes of his regime he 
continued to reference his social and economic reforms and focus on judicial reform.  However, 
unrest did not increase because the majority of dissidents were unhappy with his rapid reforms –
though the Shia clergy condemned them on several levels – nor were specific judicial procedures 
the cause of strife – though this was where international critics focused their condemnation of the 
regime.  The Shah did not understand that the fundamental cause of widespread dissent in Iran 
during the 1970s was the fact that millions of Iranians watched as the nation progressed without 
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their participation.  So when economic crisis struck after 1975 or when large swaths of the 
working poor population failed to realize the economic promises of the White Revolution, they 
could not focus their anger on any sort of political outlet.  Instead, the dispossessed were forced 
to turn to religious or ideological alternatives and violence to express their frustration.  
The revolution that began in 1977 and continued until 1979 had dramatic impacts on the 
regional security of the Persian Gulf, Middle East, Indian Ocean, and the world at large.  Further, 
it completely upset the balance and stability the Shah had so adeptly crafted during his reign.  
The effects of the Shah’s failure are still felt in the twenty first century as the Islamic regime in 
Iran continues as a main point of concern to the international community.  Meanwhile, the 
international community’s understanding of the indivisibility of human rights has improved, at 
least within the halls of the United Nations, though autocratic rulers continue to elevate national 
development over political agency, not understanding that the two are fundamentally connected 
in any long-term pursuit of development and social change.
* * * * * 
While the narrative of this project is centered on the formative character of Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, it acknowledges that the story does not in truth begin and end with the Shah.  A 
historical approach that considers the global economic connections of this story to the world-
systems of the Cold War would add a great deal to its narrative, though this is beyond the scope 
of the current project.  A deeper examination of individual/citizen-actors in Iran would also add a 
great deal to the discussion of the reception that the Shah’s rhetoric received domestically.
The conclusions in this project suggest areas for further investigation regarding human 
rights more generally and in other specific case studies in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.  In 
Iran itself, this type of rhetorical analysis could be applied to Ayatollah Khomeini’s own uses of 
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human rights rhetoric in criticizing the Shah and in his efforts to assert the Islamic Republic’s 
rights on an international scale.  This type of analysis should be paired with the gross violations 
of human rights still occurring in the Iran of the Ayatollahs.  How did the current regime’s 
international rhetoric at the United Nations, in the United States, and in regional nations collide 
with the existing domestic pressures to help create the 2009 Green Revolution in Tehran?  More 
broadly, this type of analysis would be useful in analyzing the progression of the so-called “Arab 
Awakening” of 2011.  In these nations, secular autocrats were overthrown as a result of a 
combination of political repression and socioeconomic pressures.  What role did the leaders’ 
international rhetoric play in galvanizing anti-regime support in these nations?  If a constant 
trend emerges across this region in similar political movements, what does this suggest about the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights?
This project is an attempt to explore how geopolitical concerns interact with human rights 
norms in their socioeconomic and political/civil dimensions.  It is an attempt to argue in part that 
there is a fundamental connection between the security of individuals and the security of vast 
geostrategic regions.  When national leaders and political actors invoke rhetorical devices of 
human rights, they must understand that these are not merely words that can be manipulated 
without cost.  They are real concepts that have tangible effects on their audiences, both intended 
and otherwise, and should therefore be employed with care and with a full understanding of their 
connections to each other and the situation at hand.  As the story of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
bears witness, demagogues cannot, in the modern world of vast and near-instantaneous 
communications, utilize a specific rhetorical approach in a message and expect that message to 
reach only the ears of their intended audience.
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